{
struct sctp_transport *transport = (struct sctp_transport *) arg;
- if (asoc->overall_error_count >= asoc->max_retrans) {
+ if (asoc->overall_error_count > asoc->max_retrans) {
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_SET_SK_ERR,
SCTP_ERROR(ETIMEDOUT));
/* CMD_ASSOC_FAILED calls CMD_DELETE_TCB. */
/* Check if the timestamp looks valid. */
if (time_after(hbinfo->sent_at, jiffies) ||
time_after(jiffies, hbinfo->sent_at + max_interval)) {
- SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK("%s: HEARTBEAT ACK with invalid timestamp"
+ SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK("%s: HEARTBEAT ACK with invalid timestamp "
"received for transport: %p\n",
__FUNCTION__, link);
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD;
new_asoc->c.initial_tsn = asoc->c.initial_tsn;
}
-static void sctp_auth_params_populate(struct sctp_association *new_asoc,
- const struct sctp_association *asoc)
-{
- /* Only perform this if AUTH extension is enabled */
- if (!sctp_auth_enable)
- return;
-
- /* We need to provide the same parameter information as
- * was in the original INIT. This means that we need to copy
- * the HMACS, CHUNKS, and RANDOM parameter from the original
- * assocaition.
- */
- memcpy(new_asoc->c.auth_random, asoc->c.auth_random,
- sizeof(asoc->c.auth_random));
- memcpy(new_asoc->c.auth_hmacs, asoc->c.auth_hmacs,
- sizeof(asoc->c.auth_hmacs));
- memcpy(new_asoc->c.auth_chunks, asoc->c.auth_chunks,
- sizeof(asoc->c.auth_chunks));
-}
-
/*
* Compare vtag/tietag values to determine unexpected COOKIE-ECHO
* handling action.
sctp_tietags_populate(new_asoc, asoc);
- sctp_auth_params_populate(new_asoc, asoc);
-
/* B) "Z" shall respond immediately with an INIT ACK chunk. */
/* If there are errors need to be reported for unknown parameters,
/* If we've sent any data bundled with COOKIE-ECHO we will need to
* resend
*/
- sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_RETRAN,
+ sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_T1_RETRAN,
SCTP_TRANSPORT(asoc->peer.primary_path));
/* Cast away the const modifier, as we want to just
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
}
+ /* ADD-IP: Section 4.1.1
+ * This chunk MUST be sent in an authenticated way by using
+ * the mechanism defined in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-sctp-auth]. If this chunk
+ * is received unauthenticated it MUST be silently discarded as
+ * described in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-sctp-auth].
+ */
+ if (!sctp_addip_noauth && !chunk->auth)
+ return sctp_sf_discard_chunk(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
+
/* Make sure that the ASCONF ADDIP chunk has a valid length. */
if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_addip_chunk_t)))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(ep, asoc, type, arg,
/* Verify the ASCONF chunk before processing it. */
if (!sctp_verify_asconf(asoc,
- (sctp_paramhdr_t *)((void *)addr_param + length),
- (void *)chunk->chunk_end,
- &err_param))
+ (sctp_paramhdr_t *)((void *)addr_param + length),
+ (void *)chunk->chunk_end,
+ &err_param))
return sctp_sf_violation_paramlen(ep, asoc, type,
- (void *)&err_param, commands);
+ (void *)&err_param, commands);
- /* ADDIP 4.2 C1) Compare the value of the serial number to the value
+ /* ADDIP 5.2 E1) Compare the value of the serial number to the value
* the endpoint stored in a new association variable
* 'Peer-Serial-Number'.
*/
if (serial == asoc->peer.addip_serial + 1) {
- /* ADDIP 4.2 C2) If the value found in the serial number is
- * equal to the ('Peer-Serial-Number' + 1), the endpoint MUST
- * do V1-V5.
+ /* If this is the first instance of ASCONF in the packet,
+ * we can clean our old ASCONF-ACKs.
+ */
+ if (!chunk->has_asconf)
+ sctp_assoc_clean_asconf_ack_cache(asoc);
+
+ /* ADDIP 5.2 E4) When the Sequence Number matches the next one
+ * expected, process the ASCONF as described below and after
+ * processing the ASCONF Chunk, append an ASCONF-ACK Chunk to
+ * the response packet and cache a copy of it (in the event it
+ * later needs to be retransmitted).
+ *
+ * Essentially, do V1-V5.
*/
asconf_ack = sctp_process_asconf((struct sctp_association *)
asoc, chunk);
if (!asconf_ack)
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_NOMEM;
- } else if (serial == asoc->peer.addip_serial) {
- /* ADDIP 4.2 C3) If the value found in the serial number is
- * equal to the value stored in the 'Peer-Serial-Number'
- * IMPLEMENTATION NOTE: As an optimization a receiver may wish
- * to save the last ASCONF-ACK for some predetermined period of
- * time and instead of re-processing the ASCONF (with the same
- * serial number) it may just re-transmit the ASCONF-ACK.
+ } else if (serial < asoc->peer.addip_serial + 1) {
+ /* ADDIP 5.2 E2)
+ * If the value found in the Sequence Number is less than the
+ * ('Peer- Sequence-Number' + 1), simply skip to the next
+ * ASCONF, and include in the outbound response packet
+ * any previously cached ASCONF-ACK response that was
+ * sent and saved that matches the Sequence Number of the
+ * ASCONF. Note: It is possible that no cached ASCONF-ACK
+ * Chunk exists. This will occur when an older ASCONF
+ * arrives out of order. In such a case, the receiver
+ * should skip the ASCONF Chunk and not include ASCONF-ACK
+ * Chunk for that chunk.
*/
- if (asoc->addip_last_asconf_ack)
- asconf_ack = asoc->addip_last_asconf_ack;
- else
+ asconf_ack = sctp_assoc_lookup_asconf_ack(asoc, hdr->serial);
+ if (!asconf_ack)
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD;
} else {
- /* ADDIP 4.2 C4) Otherwise, the ASCONF Chunk is discarded since
+ /* ADDIP 5.2 E5) Otherwise, the ASCONF Chunk is discarded since
* it must be either a stale packet or from an attacker.
*/
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD;
}
- /* ADDIP 4.2 C5) In both cases C2 and C3 the ASCONF-ACK MUST be sent
- * back to the source address contained in the IP header of the ASCONF
- * being responded to.
+ /* ADDIP 5.2 E6) The destination address of the SCTP packet
+ * containing the ASCONF-ACK Chunks MUST be the source address of
+ * the SCTP packet that held the ASCONF Chunks.
+ *
+ * To do this properly, we'll set the destination address of the chunk
+ * and at the transmit time, will try look up the transport to use.
+ * Since ASCONFs may be bundled, the correct transport may not be
+ * created untill we process the entire packet, thus this workaround.
*/
+ asconf_ack->dest = chunk->source;
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY, SCTP_CHUNK(asconf_ack));
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
}
+ /* ADD-IP, Section 4.1.2:
+ * This chunk MUST be sent in an authenticated way by using
+ * the mechanism defined in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-sctp-auth]. If this chunk
+ * is received unauthenticated it MUST be silently discarded as
+ * described in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-sctp-auth].
+ */
+ if (!sctp_addip_noauth && !asconf_ack->auth)
+ return sctp_sf_discard_chunk(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
+
/* Make sure that the ADDIP chunk has a valid length. */
if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(asconf_ack, sizeof(sctp_addip_chunk_t)))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(ep, asoc, type, arg,
struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;
struct sctp_chunk *abort = NULL;
- /* Make the abort chunk. */
- abort = sctp_make_abort_violation(asoc, chunk, payload, paylen);
- if (!abort)
- goto nomem;
-
/* SCTP-AUTH, Section 6.3:
* It should be noted that if the receiver wants to tear
* down an association in an authenticated way only, the
if (sctp_auth_recv_cid(SCTP_CID_ABORT, asoc))
goto discard;
+ /* Make the abort chunk. */
+ abort = sctp_make_abort_violation(asoc, chunk, payload, paylen);
+ if (!abort)
+ goto nomem;
+
if (asoc) {
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY, SCTP_CHUNK(abort));
SCTP_INC_STATS(SCTP_MIB_OUTCTRLCHUNKS);
projects / linux-2.6-omap-h63xx.git / blobdiff