2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel.h>
28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
29 #include <linux/errno.h>
30 #include <linux/sched.h>
31 #include <linux/security.h>
32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
33 #include <linux/capability.h>
34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
36 #include <linux/mman.h>
37 #include <linux/slab.h>
38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
39 #include <linux/swap.h>
40 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
41 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
42 #include <linux/file.h>
43 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
44 #include <linux/namei.h>
45 #include <linux/mount.h>
46 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
54 #include <net/netlabel.h>
55 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
56 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
57 #include <asm/atomic.h>
58 #include <linux/bitops.h>
59 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
60 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/tcp.h>
63 #include <linux/udp.h>
64 #include <linux/dccp.h>
65 #include <linux/quota.h>
66 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
67 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
68 #include <linux/parser.h>
69 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
71 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
72 #include <linux/personality.h>
73 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
74 #include <linux/audit.h>
75 #include <linux/string.h>
76 #include <linux/selinux.h>
77 #include <linux/mutex.h>
88 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
89 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
91 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 4
93 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
94 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
95 extern int selinux_compat_net;
96 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
98 /* SECMARK reference count */
99 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
101 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
102 int selinux_enforcing;
104 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
106 unsigned long enforcing;
107 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
108 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
111 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
114 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
115 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
117 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
119 unsigned long enabled;
120 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
121 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
124 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
126 int selinux_enabled = 1;
131 * Minimal support for a secondary security module,
132 * just to allow the use of the capability module.
134 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
136 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
137 before the policy was loaded. */
138 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
139 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
141 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
144 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
147 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
148 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
149 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
150 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
153 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
155 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
158 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
160 static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
162 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
164 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
168 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
169 task->security = tsec;
174 static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
176 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
177 task->security = NULL;
181 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
183 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
184 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
186 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
190 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
191 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
193 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
194 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
195 isec->task_sid = tsec->sid;
196 inode->i_security = isec;
201 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
203 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
204 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
206 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
207 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
208 list_del_init(&isec->list);
209 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
211 inode->i_security = NULL;
212 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
215 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
217 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
218 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
220 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
224 fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
225 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
226 file->f_security = fsec;
231 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
233 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
234 file->f_security = NULL;
238 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
240 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
242 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
246 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
247 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
248 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
249 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
251 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
252 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
253 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
254 sb->s_security = sbsec;
259 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
261 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
263 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
264 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
265 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
266 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
268 sb->s_security = NULL;
272 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
274 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
276 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
280 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
281 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
282 sk->sk_security = ssec;
284 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec, family);
289 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
291 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
293 sk->sk_security = NULL;
294 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssec);
298 /* The security server must be initialized before
299 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
300 extern int ss_initialized;
302 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
304 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
306 "uses transition SIDs",
308 "uses genfs_contexts",
309 "not configured for labeling",
310 "uses mountpoint labeling",
313 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
315 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
317 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
328 static match_table_t tokens = {
329 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
330 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
331 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
332 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
336 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
338 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
339 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
340 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
344 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
345 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
349 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
350 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
354 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
355 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
356 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
359 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
360 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
364 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
365 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
369 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
371 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
372 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
373 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
376 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
377 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
378 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
379 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
380 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
381 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
382 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
383 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
384 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
388 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
389 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
390 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
391 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
392 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
393 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
395 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
396 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
397 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
402 sbsec->initialized = 1;
404 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
405 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
406 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
408 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
409 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
410 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
412 /* Initialize the root inode. */
413 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
415 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
416 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
417 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
419 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
421 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
422 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
423 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
424 struct inode_security_struct, list);
425 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
426 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
427 inode = igrab(inode);
429 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
433 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
434 list_del_init(&isec->list);
437 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
443 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
444 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
445 * mount options, or whatever.
447 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
448 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
451 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
452 char *context = NULL;
456 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
458 if (!sbsec->initialized)
465 * if we ever use sbsec flags for anything other than tracking mount
466 * settings this is going to need a mask
469 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
470 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
472 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
476 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
477 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
482 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
483 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
489 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
490 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
493 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
494 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
496 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
497 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
500 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
501 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
503 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
504 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
507 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
508 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
510 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
511 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
512 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
514 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
517 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
518 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
521 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
526 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
530 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
531 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
533 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
534 if (sbsec->initialized)
535 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
536 (old_sid != new_sid))
539 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
540 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
542 if (!sbsec->initialized)
543 if (sbsec->flags & flag)
549 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
550 * labeling information.
552 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
553 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
556 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
557 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
558 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
559 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
560 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
561 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
562 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
563 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
564 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
565 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
567 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
569 if (!ss_initialized) {
571 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
572 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
573 server is ready to handle calls. */
574 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
575 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
576 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
577 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
581 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
582 "before the security server is initialized\n");
587 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
588 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
589 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
590 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
592 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
593 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
594 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
595 * will be used for both mounts)
597 if (sbsec->initialized && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
602 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
603 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
604 * than once with different security options.
606 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
608 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
609 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
611 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
612 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
613 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
620 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
622 goto out_double_mount;
624 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
629 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
631 goto out_double_mount;
633 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
635 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
636 rootcontext_sid = sid;
638 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
640 goto out_double_mount;
642 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
646 defcontext_sid = sid;
648 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
650 goto out_double_mount;
652 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
661 if (sbsec->initialized) {
662 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
663 if (sbsec->flags && !num_opts)
664 goto out_double_mount;
669 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
672 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
673 rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
675 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
676 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
680 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
683 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, tsec);
687 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
691 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
692 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
693 * the superblock context if not already set.
696 if (!fscontext_sid) {
697 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, tsec);
700 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
702 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, tsec);
706 if (!rootcontext_sid)
707 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
709 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
710 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
713 if (rootcontext_sid) {
714 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec, tsec);
718 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
719 root_isec->initialized = 1;
722 if (defcontext_sid) {
723 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
725 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
726 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
730 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
731 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
737 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
740 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
742 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
746 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
747 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
751 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
752 struct super_block *newsb)
754 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
755 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
757 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
758 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
759 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
762 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
763 * mount options. thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
766 if (!ss_initialized) {
767 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
768 if (list_empty(&newsbsec->list))
769 list_add(&newsbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
770 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
774 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
775 BUG_ON(!oldsbsec->initialized);
777 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
778 if (newsbsec->initialized)
781 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
783 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
785 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
786 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
787 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
790 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
794 if (!set_rootcontext) {
795 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
796 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
799 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
801 if (set_rootcontext) {
802 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
803 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
804 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
805 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
807 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
810 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
811 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
814 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
815 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
818 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
819 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
820 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
822 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
824 /* Standard string-based options. */
825 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
827 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
832 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
836 if (context || defcontext) {
838 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
841 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
851 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
854 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
861 case Opt_rootcontext:
864 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
867 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
875 if (context || defcontext) {
877 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
880 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
889 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
896 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
900 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
901 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
902 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
907 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
908 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
911 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
912 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
915 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
916 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
919 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
920 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
923 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
934 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
936 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
939 char *options = data;
940 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
942 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
947 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
949 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
954 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
957 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
961 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
962 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
967 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
968 char *has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
970 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
972 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
975 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
977 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
978 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
981 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
986 /* we need a comma before each option */
991 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
997 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
999 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1002 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1004 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1010 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1012 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1017 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1019 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1021 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1023 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1025 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1027 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1029 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1031 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1033 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1037 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1040 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1042 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1045 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1047 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1050 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1056 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1057 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1059 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1066 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1067 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1069 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1071 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1072 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1074 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1076 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1078 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1084 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1085 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1086 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1087 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1088 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1090 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1092 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1093 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1094 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1096 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1097 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1098 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1099 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1100 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1101 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1102 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1104 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1107 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1109 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1111 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1114 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1117 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1118 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1123 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1125 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1130 end = buffer+buflen;
1135 while (de && de != de->parent) {
1136 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1140 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1145 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1146 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1150 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1158 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1159 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1161 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1162 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1164 struct dentry *dentry;
1165 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1166 char *context = NULL;
1170 if (isec->initialized)
1173 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1174 if (isec->initialized)
1177 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1178 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
1179 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1180 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1181 server is ready to handle calls. */
1182 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1183 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1184 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1185 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1189 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1190 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1191 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1192 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1196 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1197 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1199 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1200 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1202 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1203 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1206 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: no dentry for dev=%s "
1207 "ino=%ld\n", __func__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
1212 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1213 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1219 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1221 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1222 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1223 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1231 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1237 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1243 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1244 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1245 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1246 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1250 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1251 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1254 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1258 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1259 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1260 __func__, context, -rc,
1261 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1263 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1271 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1272 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1274 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1275 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1276 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1278 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1279 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1280 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1288 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1289 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1292 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1293 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1295 if (sbsec->proc && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1296 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1298 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1299 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1310 isec->initialized = 1;
1313 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1315 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1316 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1320 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1321 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1327 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1328 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1331 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1332 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1335 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1336 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1339 /* All other signals. */
1340 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1347 /* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1348 fork check, ptrace check, etc. */
1349 static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
1350 struct task_struct *tsk2,
1353 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
1355 tsec1 = tsk1->security;
1356 tsec2 = tsk2->security;
1357 return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid,
1358 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1361 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1362 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1365 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1366 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1369 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1370 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1372 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1374 tsec = tsk->security;
1376 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1380 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1382 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1385 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1389 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1392 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, sclass, av, &ad);
1395 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1396 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1399 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1401 tsec = tsk->security;
1403 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1404 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1407 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1408 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1409 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1410 static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1411 struct inode *inode,
1413 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1415 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1416 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1417 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1419 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1422 tsec = tsk->security;
1423 isec = inode->i_security;
1427 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1428 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1431 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1434 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1435 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1436 pathname if needed. */
1437 static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1438 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1439 struct dentry *dentry,
1442 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1443 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1444 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1445 ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1446 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1447 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1450 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1451 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1452 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1453 check a particular permission to the file.
1454 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1455 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1456 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1457 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1458 static int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1462 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
1463 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1464 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1465 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1468 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1469 ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1471 if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) {
1472 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid,
1480 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1482 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1487 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1488 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1489 struct dentry *dentry,
1492 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1493 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1494 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1496 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1499 tsec = current->security;
1500 dsec = dir->i_security;
1501 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1503 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1504 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1506 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1507 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1512 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1513 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1515 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1521 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1525 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1526 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1527 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1530 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1531 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1532 struct task_struct *ctx)
1534 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1536 tsec = ctx->security;
1538 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1542 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1545 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1546 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1547 struct dentry *dentry,
1551 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1552 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1553 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1557 tsec = current->security;
1558 dsec = dir->i_security;
1559 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1561 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1562 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1565 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1566 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1581 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1586 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1590 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1591 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1592 struct inode *new_dir,
1593 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1595 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1596 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1597 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1599 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1602 tsec = current->security;
1603 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1604 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1605 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1606 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1608 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1610 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1611 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1612 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1615 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1616 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1619 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1620 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1621 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1626 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1627 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1628 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1629 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1630 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1633 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1634 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1635 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1636 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid,
1638 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1646 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1647 static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1648 struct super_block *sb,
1650 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1652 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1653 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1655 tsec = tsk->security;
1656 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1657 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1661 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1662 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1666 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1667 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1668 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1669 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1672 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1674 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1678 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1680 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1682 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1690 * Convert a file mask to an access vector and include the correct open
1693 static inline u32 open_file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1695 u32 av = file_mask_to_av(mode, mask);
1697 if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
1699 * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1703 else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
1704 av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
1705 else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
1706 av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
1707 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
1708 av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
1709 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
1712 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1713 "unknown mode:%x\n", __func__, mode);
1718 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1719 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1723 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1725 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1726 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1733 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1741 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1743 static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
1748 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
1752 if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1753 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1754 struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security;
1755 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, csec->sid,
1756 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1759 return task_has_perm(current, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1762 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1766 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_traceme(parent);
1770 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1773 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1774 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1778 error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1782 return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1785 static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1786 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1790 error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1794 return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1797 static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1798 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1800 secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1803 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
1807 rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
1811 return task_has_capability(tsk, cap);
1814 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1817 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1820 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1825 end = buffer+buflen;
1831 const char *name = table->procname;
1832 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1833 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1837 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1840 table = table->parent;
1846 memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1848 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1850 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1855 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1859 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1863 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1867 tsec = current->security;
1869 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1870 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1872 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1873 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1876 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1877 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1879 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1880 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1888 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1889 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1895 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1908 rc = superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD,
1914 rc = superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET,
1918 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1924 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1926 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1929 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1933 rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
1938 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
1939 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1940 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1942 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
1943 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
1944 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1945 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1947 case 0: /* Close log */
1948 case 1: /* Open log */
1949 case 2: /* Read from log */
1950 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1951 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
1953 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1960 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1961 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1962 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1964 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
1965 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
1966 * the capability is granted.
1968 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1969 * processes that allocate mappings.
1971 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
1973 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1974 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1976 rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
1978 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1979 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
1980 CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
1987 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
1990 /* binprm security operations */
1992 static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1994 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1996 bsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
2000 bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2003 bprm->security = bsec;
2007 static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2009 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2010 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2011 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2012 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2014 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2017 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
2021 bsec = bprm->security;
2026 tsec = current->security;
2027 isec = inode->i_security;
2029 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2030 bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
2032 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2033 tsec->create_sid = 0;
2034 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2035 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2037 if (tsec->exec_sid) {
2038 newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
2039 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2042 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2043 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2044 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
2049 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2050 ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2052 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2055 if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
2056 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2057 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2061 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2062 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
2063 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2067 rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid,
2068 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2072 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2073 current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2075 /* Set the security field to the new SID. */
2083 static int selinux_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2085 return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
2089 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2091 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2094 if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) {
2095 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2096 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2097 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2098 atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid,
2100 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2103 return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2106 static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2108 kfree(bprm->security);
2109 bprm->security = NULL;
2112 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2113 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2115 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2116 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct *files)
2118 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2119 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2120 struct tty_struct *tty;
2121 struct fdtable *fdt;
2125 mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
2126 tty = get_current_tty();
2129 file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_u.fu_list);
2131 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2132 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2133 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2134 file may belong to another process and we are only
2135 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2136 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2137 if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2138 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2144 mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
2145 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2149 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2151 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2153 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2155 unsigned long set, i;
2160 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2161 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2163 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2166 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2167 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2172 if (file_has_perm(current,
2174 file_to_av(file))) {
2176 fd = get_unused_fd();
2186 devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR);
2187 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2194 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2199 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2202 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2205 static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
2207 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2208 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2212 secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
2214 tsec = current->security;
2216 bsec = bprm->security;
2219 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
2221 if (tsec->sid != sid) {
2222 /* Check for shared state. If not ok, leave SID
2223 unchanged and kill. */
2224 if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2225 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2226 PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
2233 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
2234 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
2235 if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2236 struct task_struct *tracer;
2237 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2241 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
2242 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2243 sec = tracer->security;
2249 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2250 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2262 * called after apply_creds without the task lock held
2264 static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2266 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2267 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2268 struct itimerval itimer;
2269 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2272 tsec = current->security;
2273 bsec = bprm->security;
2276 force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current);
2279 if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid)
2282 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2283 flush_unauthorized_files(current->files);
2285 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state
2286 from the old SID. If not, clear itimers to avoid
2287 subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock
2288 signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has
2289 been updated so that any kill done after the flush
2290 will be checked against the new SID. */
2291 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2292 PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2294 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2295 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2296 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2297 flush_signals(current);
2298 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2299 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2300 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2301 recalc_sigpending();
2302 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2305 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2306 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2308 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits
2309 from the old SID. If not, reset all soft limits to
2310 the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init
2311 task's soft limit. Note that the setting of hard limits
2312 (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit
2313 check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into
2314 the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher
2315 than the default soft limit for cases where the default
2316 is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or
2318 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2319 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2321 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2322 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2323 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
2324 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2326 if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) {
2328 * This will cause RLIMIT_CPU calculations
2331 current->it_prof_expires = jiffies_to_cputime(1);
2335 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
2336 recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */
2337 wake_up_interruptible(¤t->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
2340 /* superblock security operations */
2342 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2344 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2347 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2349 superblock_free_security(sb);
2352 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2357 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2360 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2362 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2363 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2364 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2365 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len));
2368 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2375 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2379 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2382 int current_size = 0;
2390 while (current_size < len) {
2400 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2402 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2403 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2404 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2410 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2418 in_save = in_end = orig;
2422 open_quote = !open_quote;
2423 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2425 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2427 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2428 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2430 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2432 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2434 } while (*in_end++);
2436 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2437 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2442 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2444 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2447 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2451 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2452 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2453 return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2456 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2458 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2460 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2461 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2462 return superblock_has_perm(current, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2465 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2468 unsigned long flags,
2473 rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
2477 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2478 return superblock_has_perm(current, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2479 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2481 return dentry_has_perm(current, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2485 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2489 rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
2493 return superblock_has_perm(current, mnt->mnt_sb,
2494 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2497 /* inode security operations */
2499 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2501 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2504 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2506 inode_free_security(inode);
2509 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2510 char **name, void **value,
2513 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2514 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2515 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2518 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2520 tsec = current->security;
2521 dsec = dir->i_security;
2522 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2524 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
2525 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2527 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
2528 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2531 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2532 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2535 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2540 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2541 if (sbsec->initialized) {
2542 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2543 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2545 isec->initialized = 1;
2548 if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2552 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2559 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2571 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2573 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2576 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2580 rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
2583 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2586 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2590 rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2593 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2596 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2598 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2601 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2603 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2606 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2608 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2611 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2615 rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2619 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2622 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2623 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2625 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2628 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2630 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2633 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2637 rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, nameidata);
2640 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2643 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2647 rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask);
2652 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2656 return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2657 open_file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2660 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2664 rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2668 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2671 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2672 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2673 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2675 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2678 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2680 return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2683 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2685 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2686 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2687 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2688 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2690 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2691 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2692 Restrict to administrator. */
2697 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2698 ordinary setattr permission. */
2699 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2702 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2703 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2705 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2706 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2707 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2708 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2709 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2713 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2714 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2716 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2717 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2720 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2723 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2724 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2726 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2727 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2731 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2732 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2733 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2735 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2740 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2741 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2745 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid,
2750 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2752 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2753 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2757 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2758 const void *value, size_t size,
2761 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2762 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2766 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2767 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2771 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2773 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2774 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2775 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2783 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2785 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2788 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2790 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2793 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2795 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2796 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2798 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2799 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2804 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2806 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2808 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2812 char *context = NULL;
2813 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2814 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2816 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2820 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2821 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2822 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2823 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2824 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2825 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2826 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2828 error = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_MAC_ADMIN);
2830 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
2831 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2,
2832 CAPABILITY2__MAC_ADMIN,
2836 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2839 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2852 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2853 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2855 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2859 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2862 if (!value || !size)
2865 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2873 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2875 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2876 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2877 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2881 static int selinux_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2883 return secondary_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
2886 static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2888 return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
2891 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2893 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2897 /* file security operations */
2899 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2902 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2905 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2909 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2910 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2913 rc = file_has_perm(current, file,
2914 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2918 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2921 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2923 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2924 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2925 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2926 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2929 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2933 if (tsec->sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid
2934 && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2935 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2937 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2940 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2942 return file_alloc_security(file);
2945 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2947 file_free_security(file);
2950 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2955 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
2957 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
2962 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2965 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2967 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2968 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
2970 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2971 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2972 * This has an additional check.
2974 int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
2981 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2982 u32 av = FILE__READ;
2984 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2985 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
2988 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
2989 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2991 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2996 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
2997 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
2998 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
3001 u32 sid = ((struct task_security_struct *)(current->security))->sid;
3003 if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
3004 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3005 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3006 if (rc || addr_only)
3009 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3012 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3013 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3016 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3017 unsigned long reqprot,
3022 rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
3026 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3029 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3030 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3032 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3033 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3034 rc = task_has_perm(current, current,
3036 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3037 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3038 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3039 rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3040 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3042 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3043 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3044 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3045 * modified content. This typically should only
3046 * occur for text relocations.
3048 rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file,
3056 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3059 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3061 return file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
3064 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3071 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3076 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3077 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__WRITE);
3086 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3087 err = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
3092 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3097 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3101 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
3108 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3110 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3111 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3113 tsec = current->security;
3114 fsec = file->f_security;
3115 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
3120 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3121 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3125 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3126 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3128 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3129 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3131 tsec = tsk->security;
3132 fsec = file->f_security;
3135 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3137 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3139 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, tsec->sid,
3140 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3143 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3145 return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file));
3148 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file)
3150 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3151 struct inode *inode;
3152 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3153 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3154 fsec = file->f_security;
3155 isec = inode->i_security;
3157 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3158 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3159 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3160 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3161 * struct as its SID.
3163 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3164 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3166 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3167 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3168 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3169 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3170 * new inode label or new policy.
3171 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3173 return inode_has_perm(current, inode, file_to_av(file), NULL);
3176 /* task security operations */
3178 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3182 rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
3186 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
3189 static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
3191 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
3194 tsec1 = current->security;
3196 rc = task_alloc_security(tsk);
3199 tsec2 = tsk->security;
3201 tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
3202 tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
3204 /* Retain the exec, fs, key, and sock SIDs across fork */
3205 tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid;
3206 tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
3207 tsec2->keycreate_sid = tsec1->keycreate_sid;
3208 tsec2->sockcreate_sid = tsec1->sockcreate_sid;
3213 static void selinux_task_free_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
3215 task_free_security(tsk);
3218 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3220 /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
3221 since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
3222 identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
3223 this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
3224 of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
3229 static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3231 return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0, id1, id2, flags);
3234 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
3236 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3240 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3242 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3245 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3247 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3250 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3252 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3255 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3257 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
3261 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
3263 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3267 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3271 rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
3275 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3278 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3282 rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3286 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3289 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3291 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3294 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3296 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
3299 rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
3303 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3304 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3305 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3306 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */
3307 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3308 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3313 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
3317 rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
3321 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3324 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3326 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3329 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3331 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3334 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3339 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3341 rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
3346 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3348 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3351 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3353 rc = task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
3357 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
3364 /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
3365 any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
3366 the state of the current process. */
3367 return secondary_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, rc_p);
3370 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3372 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3375 static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
3377 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3379 secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
3382 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
3383 tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3387 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3388 struct inode *inode)
3390 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
3391 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3393 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
3394 isec->initialized = 1;
3398 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3399 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3400 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3402 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3403 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3405 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3406 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3410 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3411 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3414 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3415 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3419 *proto = ih->protocol;
3421 switch (ih->protocol) {
3423 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3425 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3429 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3433 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3434 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3439 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3441 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3445 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3449 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3450 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3454 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3455 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3457 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3461 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3465 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3466 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3477 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3479 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3480 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3481 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3484 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3485 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3487 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3488 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3492 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3493 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3496 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3497 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3498 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3507 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3509 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3513 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3514 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3519 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3521 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3525 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3526 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3530 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3531 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3533 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3537 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3538 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3542 /* includes fragments */
3552 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3553 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3558 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3560 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3563 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3564 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3567 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3569 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3572 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3573 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3583 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3584 " unable to parse packet\n");
3594 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3596 * @family: protocol family
3597 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3600 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3601 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3602 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3603 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3604 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3608 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3615 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3616 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3618 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3619 if (unlikely(err)) {
3621 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3622 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3629 /* socket security operations */
3630 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3633 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3634 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3635 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3638 tsec = task->security;
3639 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3641 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3644 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3645 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3646 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3652 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3653 int protocol, int kern)
3656 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3662 tsec = current->security;
3663 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3664 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
3665 socket_type_to_security_class(family, type,
3666 protocol), SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3672 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3673 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3676 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3677 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3678 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3681 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3683 tsec = current->security;
3684 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3685 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3686 isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : newsid;
3687 isec->initialized = 1;
3690 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3691 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3692 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3693 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
3699 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3700 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3701 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3703 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3708 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3713 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3714 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3715 * check the first address now.
3717 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3718 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3720 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3721 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3722 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3723 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3724 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3725 unsigned short snum;
3726 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3729 tsec = current->security;
3730 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3732 if (family == PF_INET) {
3733 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3734 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3735 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3737 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3738 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3739 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3745 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3747 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3748 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3752 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3753 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3754 ad.u.net.family = family;
3755 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3757 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3763 switch (isec->sclass) {
3764 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3765 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3768 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3769 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3772 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3773 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3777 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3781 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3785 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3786 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3787 ad.u.net.family = family;
3789 if (family == PF_INET)
3790 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3792 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3794 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3795 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3803 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3805 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3806 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3809 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3814 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3816 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3817 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3818 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3819 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3820 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3821 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3822 unsigned short snum;
3825 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3826 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3827 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3829 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3831 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3832 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3834 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3837 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3841 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3842 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3844 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3845 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3846 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3847 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3852 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3858 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3860 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3863 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3866 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3867 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3869 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3873 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3875 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3876 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3877 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3878 newisec->initialized = 1;
3883 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3888 rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3892 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
3895 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3896 int size, int flags)
3898 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3901 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3903 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3906 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3908 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3911 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
3915 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3919 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3922 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3925 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3928 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3930 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3933 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3934 struct socket *other,
3937 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3938 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3939 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3940 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3943 err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
3947 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3948 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3950 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3951 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3953 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3955 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3959 /* connecting socket */
3960 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3961 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3963 /* server child socket */
3964 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3965 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3966 err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
3971 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3972 struct socket *other)
3974 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3975 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3976 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3979 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3980 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3982 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3983 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3985 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3986 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
3993 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
3995 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
4001 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4004 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4005 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4009 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4012 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4013 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4016 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4017 struct sk_buff *skb,
4018 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4023 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4025 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, recv_perm;
4026 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4028 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4029 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4032 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4033 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
4034 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
4035 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4037 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4038 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
4039 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
4040 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4042 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4043 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
4044 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
4045 recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4048 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
4049 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
4054 err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
4057 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4061 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4064 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4070 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4071 ntohs(ad->u.net.sport), &port_sid);
4072 if (unlikely(err)) {
4074 "SELinux: failure in"
4075 " selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(),"
4076 " network port label not found\n");
4079 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, recv_perm, ad);
4082 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4086 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4088 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4089 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4092 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4093 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4094 ad.u.net.family = family;
4095 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4099 if (selinux_compat_net)
4100 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
4103 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4108 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4109 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4112 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4113 SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad);
4115 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4117 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4120 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4126 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4129 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4130 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4131 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4132 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4137 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4140 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4141 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4144 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4145 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4146 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4147 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4148 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4149 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4151 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4152 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4153 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4156 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4157 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4158 ad.u.net.family = family;
4159 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4163 if (peerlbl_active) {
4166 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4169 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family,
4172 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4175 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4178 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4181 if (secmark_active) {
4182 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4191 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4192 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4197 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4198 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4199 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4201 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4203 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4204 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
4205 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4206 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4208 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4213 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4218 if (scontext_len > len) {
4223 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4227 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4235 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4237 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4240 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4242 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4245 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4249 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4250 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4252 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4255 *secid = peer_secid;
4256 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4261 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4263 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
4266 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4268 sk_free_security(sk);
4271 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4273 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
4274 struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
4276 newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
4277 newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4278 newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
4280 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec, newsk->sk_family);
4283 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4286 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4288 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4290 *secid = sksec->sid;
4294 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4296 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4297 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4299 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4300 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4301 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4302 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4305 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4306 struct request_sock *req)
4308 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4310 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4314 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4315 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4318 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4321 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4322 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4323 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4327 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4331 req->secid = newsid;
4332 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4336 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4337 const struct request_sock *req)
4339 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4341 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4342 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4343 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4344 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4345 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4346 time it will have been created and available. */
4348 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4349 * thread with access to newsksec */
4350 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
4353 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4355 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4356 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4358 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4359 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4362 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4364 selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_established(sk, family);
4367 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4370 fl->secid = req->secid;
4373 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4377 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4378 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
4379 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4381 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4385 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4387 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4389 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4390 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4391 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4392 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4393 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
4394 if (!selinux_enforcing)
4404 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
4409 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4411 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4417 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4422 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4425 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4426 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4427 peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4428 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4431 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4434 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4435 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4436 ad.u.net.family = family;
4437 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4440 if (peerlbl_active) {
4441 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4444 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4450 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4451 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4455 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4456 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4457 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4459 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4465 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4466 struct sk_buff *skb,
4467 const struct net_device *in,
4468 const struct net_device *out,
4469 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4471 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4474 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4475 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4476 struct sk_buff *skb,
4477 const struct net_device *in,
4478 const struct net_device *out,
4479 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4481 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4485 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4490 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4493 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4494 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4495 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4497 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4500 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4501 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4507 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4508 struct sk_buff *skb,
4509 const struct net_device *in,
4510 const struct net_device *out,
4511 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4513 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4516 static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4518 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4519 u16 family, char *addrp)
4522 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4524 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, send_perm;
4525 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4527 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4528 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4531 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4532 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
4533 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
4534 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4536 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4537 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
4538 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
4539 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4541 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4542 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
4543 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
4544 send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4547 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
4548 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
4553 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4556 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4559 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4562 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4569 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4570 ntohs(ad->u.net.dport), &port_sid);
4571 if (unlikely(err)) {
4573 "SELinux: failure in"
4574 " selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(),"
4575 " network port label not found\n");
4578 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, send_perm, ad);
4581 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4585 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4586 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4587 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4593 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4595 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4596 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4597 ad.u.net.family = family;
4598 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4601 if (selinux_compat_net) {
4602 if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex,
4603 &ad, family, addrp))
4606 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4607 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4611 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4612 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4618 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4624 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4629 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4630 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4631 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4632 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4633 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4634 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4636 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4637 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4638 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4639 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4640 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4641 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4642 if (skb->dst != NULL && skb->dst->xfrm != NULL)
4645 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4646 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4647 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4650 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4651 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4652 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4653 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4658 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED)
4659 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4661 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4664 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED)
4665 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4667 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4672 if (secmark_perm == PACKET__FORWARD_OUT) {
4673 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4676 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4678 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4679 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4680 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4683 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4684 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4685 ad.u.net.family = family;
4686 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4690 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4691 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4694 if (peerlbl_active) {
4698 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4700 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4701 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4704 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4706 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4707 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4714 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4715 struct sk_buff *skb,
4716 const struct net_device *in,
4717 const struct net_device *out,
4718 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4720 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4723 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4724 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4725 struct sk_buff *skb,
4726 const struct net_device *in,
4727 const struct net_device *out,
4728 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4730 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4734 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4736 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4740 err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
4744 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
4745 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4750 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4753 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4755 err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4759 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4760 ad.u.cap = capability;
4762 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4763 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4766 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4767 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4770 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
4771 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4773 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4777 isec->sclass = sclass;
4778 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
4779 perm->security = isec;
4784 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4786 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4787 perm->security = NULL;
4791 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4793 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4795 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4799 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4800 msg->security = msec;
4805 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4807 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4809 msg->security = NULL;
4813 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4816 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4817 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4818 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4820 tsec = current->security;
4821 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4823 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4824 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4826 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4829 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4831 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4834 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4836 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4839 /* message queue security operations */
4840 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4842 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4843 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4844 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4847 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4851 tsec = current->security;
4852 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4854 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4855 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4857 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4860 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4866 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4868 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4871 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4873 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4874 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4875 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4877 tsec = current->security;
4878 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4880 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4881 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4883 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4884 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4887 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4895 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4896 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4899 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4902 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4905 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4911 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4915 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4917 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4918 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4919 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4920 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4923 tsec = current->security;
4924 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4925 msec = msg->security;
4928 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4930 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4932 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4933 * message queue this message will be stored in
4935 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
4943 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4944 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4946 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4947 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4950 /* Can this process send the message */
4951 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4952 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad);
4954 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4955 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid,
4956 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4961 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4962 struct task_struct *target,
4963 long type, int mode)
4965 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4966 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4967 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4968 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4971 tsec = target->security;
4972 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4973 msec = msg->security;
4975 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4976 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4978 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
4979 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4981 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4982 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4986 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4987 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4989 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4990 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4991 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4994 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
4998 tsec = current->security;
4999 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5001 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5002 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5004 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5007 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5013 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5015 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5018 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5020 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5021 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5022 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5024 tsec = current->security;
5025 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5027 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5028 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5030 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5031 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5034 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5035 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5043 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5044 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5047 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5050 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5057 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5063 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5067 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5068 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5073 rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
5077 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5080 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5082 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5085 /* Semaphore security operations */
5086 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5088 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5089 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5090 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5093 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5097 tsec = current->security;
5098 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5100 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5101 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5103 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5106 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5112 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5114 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5117 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5119 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5120 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5121 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5123 tsec = current->security;
5124 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5126 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5127 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5129 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5130 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5133 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5134 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5142 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5143 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5147 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5158 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5161 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5165 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5171 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5175 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5176 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5181 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5185 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5188 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5194 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5196 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5201 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5204 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5206 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5210 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5213 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5216 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5217 char *name, char **value)
5219 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5225 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5232 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5234 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5236 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5237 sid = tsec->exec_sid;
5238 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5239 sid = tsec->create_sid;
5240 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5241 sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5242 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5243 sid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5250 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5256 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5257 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5259 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5260 struct task_struct *tracer;
5266 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5267 security attributes. */
5272 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5273 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5274 * above restriction is ever removed.
5276 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5277 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5278 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5279 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5280 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5281 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5282 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5283 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5284 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5285 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5291 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5292 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5293 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5297 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5298 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5299 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5301 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5308 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5309 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5310 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5311 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve
5312 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5313 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5315 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5316 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5317 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5318 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5319 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5320 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5323 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5324 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5325 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5326 else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5327 struct av_decision avd;
5332 * SELinux allows to change context in the following case only.
5333 * - Single threaded processes.
5334 * - Multi threaded processes intend to change its context into
5335 * more restricted domain (defined by TYPEBOUNDS statement).
5337 if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) {
5338 struct task_struct *g, *t;
5339 struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
5340 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
5341 do_each_thread(g, t) {
5342 if (t->mm == mm && t != p) {
5343 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
5344 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5350 } while_each_thread(g, t);
5351 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
5355 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5356 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5357 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5361 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5362 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5365 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
5366 if (tracer != NULL) {
5367 struct task_security_struct *ptsec = tracer->security;
5368 u32 ptsid = ptsec->sid;
5370 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ptsid, sid,
5372 PROCESS__PTRACE, 0, &avd);
5376 avc_audit(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5377 PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL);
5391 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5393 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5396 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5398 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5401 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5408 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, struct task_struct *tsk,
5409 unsigned long flags)
5411 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
5412 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5414 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5418 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5419 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5421 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5427 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5429 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5435 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5436 struct task_struct *ctx,
5440 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5441 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5443 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5445 tsec = ctx->security;
5446 ksec = key->security;
5448 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5449 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5450 appear to be created. */
5454 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksec->sid,
5455 SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5458 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5460 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5461 char *context = NULL;
5465 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5474 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5477 .ptrace_may_access = selinux_ptrace_may_access,
5478 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5479 .capget = selinux_capget,
5480 .capset_check = selinux_capset_check,
5481 .capset_set = selinux_capset_set,
5482 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
5483 .capable = selinux_capable,
5484 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5485 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5486 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5487 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5489 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5490 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5492 .bprm_alloc_security = selinux_bprm_alloc_security,
5493 .bprm_free_security = selinux_bprm_free_security,
5494 .bprm_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_apply_creds,
5495 .bprm_post_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds,
5496 .bprm_set_security = selinux_bprm_set_security,
5497 .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security,
5498 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5500 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5501 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5502 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5503 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5504 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5505 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5506 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5507 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5508 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5509 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5510 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5513 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5514 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5515 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5516 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5517 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5518 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5519 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5520 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5521 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5522 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5523 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5524 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5525 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5526 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5527 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5528 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5529 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5530 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5531 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5532 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5533 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5534 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5535 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5536 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5537 .inode_need_killpriv = selinux_inode_need_killpriv,
5538 .inode_killpriv = selinux_inode_killpriv,
5539 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5541 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5542 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5543 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5544 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5545 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5546 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5547 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5548 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5549 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5550 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5551 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5553 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5555 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5556 .task_alloc_security = selinux_task_alloc_security,
5557 .task_free_security = selinux_task_free_security,
5558 .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
5559 .task_post_setuid = selinux_task_post_setuid,
5560 .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
5561 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5562 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5563 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5564 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5565 .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
5566 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5567 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5568 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5569 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5570 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5571 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5572 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5573 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5574 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5575 .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
5576 .task_reparent_to_init = selinux_task_reparent_to_init,
5577 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5579 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5580 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5582 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5583 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5585 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5586 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5587 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5588 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5589 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5590 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5592 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5593 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5594 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5595 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5596 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5598 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5599 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5600 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5601 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5602 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5604 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5606 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5607 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5609 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5610 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5611 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5613 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5614 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5616 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5617 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5618 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5619 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5620 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5621 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5622 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5623 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5624 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5625 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5626 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5627 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5628 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5629 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5630 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5631 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5632 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5633 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5634 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5635 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5636 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5637 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5638 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5639 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5640 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5642 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5643 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5644 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5645 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5646 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5647 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5648 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5649 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5650 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5651 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5652 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5656 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5657 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5658 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5659 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5663 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5664 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5665 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5666 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5670 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5672 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5674 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5675 selinux_enabled = 0;
5679 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5680 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5684 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5686 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5687 if (task_alloc_security(current))
5688 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
5689 tsec = current->security;
5690 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5692 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5693 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5694 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5697 secondary_ops = security_ops;
5699 panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5700 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5701 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5703 if (selinux_enforcing)
5704 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5706 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5711 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5713 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5715 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5716 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5717 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5718 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5720 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
5721 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
5722 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
5723 struct superblock_security_struct,
5725 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
5727 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5728 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5729 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
5731 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5733 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5734 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5735 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
5738 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5739 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5742 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5743 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5744 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5746 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5748 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5750 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5751 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5753 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5754 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5757 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5758 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5760 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5761 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5764 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
5765 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5767 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5768 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5772 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5774 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5776 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5777 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5779 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5780 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5783 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5784 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5786 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5787 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5793 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5797 if (!selinux_enabled)
5800 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5802 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5804 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5806 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5807 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5809 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5816 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5818 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5819 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5821 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5823 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5824 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5825 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5830 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5832 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5833 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5836 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5838 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5839 static int selinux_disabled;
5841 int selinux_disable(void)
5843 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5845 if (ss_initialized) {
5846 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5850 if (selinux_disabled) {
5851 /* Only do this once. */
5855 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5857 selinux_disabled = 1;
5858 selinux_enabled = 0;
5860 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5861 security_ops = secondary_ops;
5863 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5864 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5866 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */