2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel.h>
28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
29 #include <linux/errno.h>
30 #include <linux/sched.h>
31 #include <linux/security.h>
32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
33 #include <linux/capability.h>
34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
36 #include <linux/mman.h>
37 #include <linux/slab.h>
38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
39 #include <linux/swap.h>
40 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
41 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
42 #include <linux/file.h>
43 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
44 #include <linux/namei.h>
45 #include <linux/mount.h>
46 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
54 #include <net/netlabel.h>
55 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
56 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
57 #include <asm/atomic.h>
58 #include <linux/bitops.h>
59 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
60 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/tcp.h>
63 #include <linux/udp.h>
64 #include <linux/dccp.h>
65 #include <linux/quota.h>
66 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
67 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
68 #include <linux/parser.h>
69 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
71 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
72 #include <linux/personality.h>
73 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
74 #include <linux/audit.h>
75 #include <linux/string.h>
76 #include <linux/selinux.h>
77 #include <linux/mutex.h>
88 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
89 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
91 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 4
93 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
94 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
95 extern int selinux_compat_net;
96 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
98 /* SECMARK reference count */
99 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
101 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
102 int selinux_enforcing;
104 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
106 unsigned long enforcing;
107 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
108 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
111 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
114 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
115 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
117 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
119 unsigned long enabled;
120 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
121 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
124 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
126 int selinux_enabled = 1;
131 * Minimal support for a secondary security module,
132 * just to allow the use of the capability module.
134 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
136 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
137 before the policy was loaded. */
138 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
139 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
141 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
144 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
147 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
148 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
149 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
150 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
153 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
155 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
158 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
160 static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
162 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
164 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
168 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
169 task->security = tsec;
174 static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
176 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
177 task->security = NULL;
181 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
183 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
184 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
186 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
190 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
191 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
193 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
194 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
195 isec->task_sid = tsec->sid;
196 inode->i_security = isec;
201 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
203 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
204 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
206 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
207 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
208 list_del_init(&isec->list);
209 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
211 inode->i_security = NULL;
212 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
215 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
217 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
218 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
220 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
224 fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
225 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
226 file->f_security = fsec;
231 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
233 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
234 file->f_security = NULL;
238 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
240 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
242 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
246 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
247 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
248 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
249 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
251 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
252 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
253 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
254 sb->s_security = sbsec;
259 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
261 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
263 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
264 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
265 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
266 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
268 sb->s_security = NULL;
272 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
274 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
276 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
280 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
281 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
282 sk->sk_security = ssec;
284 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec, family);
289 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
291 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
293 sk->sk_security = NULL;
297 /* The security server must be initialized before
298 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
299 extern int ss_initialized;
301 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
303 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
305 "uses transition SIDs",
307 "uses genfs_contexts",
308 "not configured for labeling",
309 "uses mountpoint labeling",
312 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
314 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
316 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
327 static match_table_t tokens = {
328 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
329 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
330 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
331 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
335 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
337 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
338 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
339 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
343 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
344 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
348 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
349 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
353 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
354 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
355 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
358 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
359 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
363 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
364 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
368 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
370 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
371 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
372 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
375 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
376 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
377 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
378 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
379 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
380 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
381 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
382 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
383 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
387 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
388 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
389 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
390 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
391 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
392 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
394 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
395 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
396 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
401 sbsec->initialized = 1;
403 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
404 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
405 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
407 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
408 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
409 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
411 /* Initialize the root inode. */
412 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
414 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
415 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
416 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
418 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
420 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
421 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
422 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
423 struct inode_security_struct, list);
424 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
425 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
426 inode = igrab(inode);
428 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
432 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
433 list_del_init(&isec->list);
436 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
442 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
443 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
444 * mount options, or whatever.
446 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
447 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
450 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
451 char *context = NULL;
455 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
457 if (!sbsec->initialized)
464 * if we ever use sbsec flags for anything other than tracking mount
465 * settings this is going to need a mask
468 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
469 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
471 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
475 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
476 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
481 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
482 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
488 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
489 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
492 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
493 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
495 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
496 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
499 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
500 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
502 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
503 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
506 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
507 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
509 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
510 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
511 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
513 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
516 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
517 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
520 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
525 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
529 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
530 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
532 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
533 if (sbsec->initialized)
534 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
535 (old_sid != new_sid))
538 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
539 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
541 if (!sbsec->initialized)
542 if (sbsec->flags & flag)
548 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
549 * labeling information.
551 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
552 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
555 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
556 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
557 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
558 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
559 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
560 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
561 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
562 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
563 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
564 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
566 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
568 if (!ss_initialized) {
570 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
571 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
572 server is ready to handle calls. */
573 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
574 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
575 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
576 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
580 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
581 "before the security server is initialized\n");
586 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
587 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
588 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
589 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
591 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
592 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
593 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
594 * will be used for both mounts)
596 if (sbsec->initialized && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
601 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
602 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
603 * than once with different security options.
605 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
607 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
608 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
610 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
611 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
612 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
619 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
621 goto out_double_mount;
623 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
628 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
630 goto out_double_mount;
632 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
634 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
635 rootcontext_sid = sid;
637 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
639 goto out_double_mount;
641 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
645 defcontext_sid = sid;
647 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
649 goto out_double_mount;
651 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
660 if (sbsec->initialized) {
661 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
662 if (sbsec->flags && !num_opts)
663 goto out_double_mount;
668 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
671 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
672 rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
674 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
675 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
679 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
682 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, tsec);
686 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
690 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
691 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
692 * the superblock context if not already set.
695 if (!fscontext_sid) {
696 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, tsec);
699 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
701 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, tsec);
705 if (!rootcontext_sid)
706 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
708 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
709 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
712 if (rootcontext_sid) {
713 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec, tsec);
717 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
718 root_isec->initialized = 1;
721 if (defcontext_sid) {
722 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
724 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
725 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
729 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
730 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
736 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
739 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
741 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
745 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
746 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
750 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
751 struct super_block *newsb)
753 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
754 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
756 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
757 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
758 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
761 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
762 * mount options. thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
765 if (!ss_initialized) {
766 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
767 if (list_empty(&newsbsec->list))
768 list_add(&newsbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
769 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
773 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
774 BUG_ON(!oldsbsec->initialized);
776 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
777 if (newsbsec->initialized)
780 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
782 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
784 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
785 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
786 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
789 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
793 if (!set_rootcontext) {
794 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
795 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
798 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
800 if (set_rootcontext) {
801 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
802 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
803 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
804 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
806 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
809 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
810 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
813 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
814 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
817 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
818 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
819 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
821 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
823 /* Standard string-based options. */
824 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
826 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
831 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
835 if (context || defcontext) {
837 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
840 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
850 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
853 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
860 case Opt_rootcontext:
863 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
866 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
874 if (context || defcontext) {
876 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
879 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
888 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
895 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
899 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
900 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
901 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
906 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
907 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
910 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
911 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
914 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
915 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
918 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
919 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
922 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
933 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
935 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
938 char *options = data;
939 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
941 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
946 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
948 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
953 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
956 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
960 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
961 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
966 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
967 char *has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
969 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
971 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
974 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
976 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
977 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
980 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
985 /* we need a comma before each option */
990 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
996 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
998 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1001 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1003 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1009 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1011 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1016 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1018 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1020 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1022 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1024 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1026 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1028 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1030 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1032 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1036 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1039 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1041 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1044 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1046 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1049 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1055 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1056 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1058 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1065 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1066 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1068 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1070 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1071 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1073 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1075 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1077 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1083 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1084 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1085 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1086 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1087 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1089 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1091 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1092 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1093 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1095 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1096 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1097 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1098 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1099 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1100 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1101 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1103 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1106 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1108 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1110 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1113 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1116 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1117 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1122 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1124 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1129 end = buffer+buflen;
1134 while (de && de != de->parent) {
1135 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1139 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1144 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1145 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1149 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1157 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1158 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1160 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1161 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1163 struct dentry *dentry;
1164 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1165 char *context = NULL;
1169 if (isec->initialized)
1172 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1173 if (isec->initialized)
1176 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1177 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
1178 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1179 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1180 server is ready to handle calls. */
1181 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1182 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1183 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1184 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1188 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1189 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1190 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1191 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1195 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1196 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1198 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1199 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1201 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1202 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1205 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: no dentry for dev=%s "
1206 "ino=%ld\n", __func__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
1211 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1212 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1218 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1220 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1221 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1222 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1230 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1236 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1242 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1243 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1244 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1245 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1249 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1250 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1253 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1257 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1258 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1259 __func__, context, -rc,
1260 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1262 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1270 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1271 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1273 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1274 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1275 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1277 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1278 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1279 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1287 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1288 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1291 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1292 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1295 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1297 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1298 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1309 isec->initialized = 1;
1312 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1314 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1315 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1319 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1320 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1326 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1327 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1330 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1331 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1334 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1335 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1338 /* All other signals. */
1339 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1346 /* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1347 fork check, ptrace check, etc. */
1348 static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
1349 struct task_struct *tsk2,
1352 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
1354 tsec1 = tsk1->security;
1355 tsec2 = tsk2->security;
1356 return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid,
1357 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1360 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1361 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1364 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1365 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1368 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1369 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1371 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1373 tsec = tsk->security;
1375 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1379 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1381 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1384 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1388 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1391 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, sclass, av, &ad);
1394 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1395 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1398 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1400 tsec = tsk->security;
1402 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1403 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1406 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1407 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1408 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1409 static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1410 struct inode *inode,
1412 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1414 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1415 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1416 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1418 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1421 tsec = tsk->security;
1422 isec = inode->i_security;
1426 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1427 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1430 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1433 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1434 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1435 pathname if needed. */
1436 static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1437 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1438 struct dentry *dentry,
1441 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1442 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1443 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1444 ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1445 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1446 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1449 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1450 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1451 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1452 check a particular permission to the file.
1453 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1454 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1455 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1456 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1457 static int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1461 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
1462 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1463 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1464 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1467 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1468 ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1470 if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) {
1471 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid,
1479 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1481 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1486 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1487 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1488 struct dentry *dentry,
1491 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1492 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1493 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1495 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1498 tsec = current->security;
1499 dsec = dir->i_security;
1500 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1502 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1503 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1505 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1506 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1511 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1512 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1514 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1520 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1524 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1525 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1526 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1529 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1530 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1531 struct task_struct *ctx)
1533 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1535 tsec = ctx->security;
1537 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1541 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1544 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1545 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1546 struct dentry *dentry,
1550 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1551 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1552 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1556 tsec = current->security;
1557 dsec = dir->i_security;
1558 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1560 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1561 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1564 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1565 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1580 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1585 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1589 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1590 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1591 struct inode *new_dir,
1592 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1594 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1595 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1596 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1598 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1601 tsec = current->security;
1602 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1603 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1604 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1605 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1607 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1609 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1610 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1611 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1614 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1615 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1618 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1619 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1620 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1625 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1626 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1627 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1628 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1629 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1632 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1633 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1634 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1635 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid,
1637 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1645 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1646 static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1647 struct super_block *sb,
1649 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1651 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1652 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1654 tsec = tsk->security;
1655 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1656 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1660 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1661 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1665 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1666 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1667 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1668 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1671 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1673 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1677 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1679 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1681 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1689 * Convert a file mask to an access vector and include the correct open
1692 static inline u32 open_file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1694 u32 av = file_mask_to_av(mode, mask);
1696 if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
1698 * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1702 else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
1703 av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
1704 else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
1705 av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
1706 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
1707 av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
1708 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
1711 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1712 "unknown mode:%x\n", __func__, mode);
1717 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1718 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1722 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1724 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1725 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1732 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1740 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1742 static int selinux_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent,
1743 struct task_struct *child,
1748 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace(parent, child, mode);
1752 if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1753 struct task_security_struct *tsec = parent->security;
1754 struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security;
1755 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, csec->sid,
1756 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1759 return task_has_perm(parent, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1762 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1763 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1767 error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1771 return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1774 static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1775 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1779 error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1783 return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1786 static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1787 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1789 secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1792 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
1796 rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
1800 return task_has_capability(tsk, cap);
1803 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1806 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1809 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1814 end = buffer+buflen;
1820 const char *name = table->procname;
1821 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1822 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1826 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1829 table = table->parent;
1835 memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1837 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1839 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1844 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1848 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1852 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1856 tsec = current->security;
1858 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1859 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1861 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1862 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1865 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1866 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1868 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1869 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1877 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1878 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1884 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1897 rc = superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD,
1903 rc = superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET,
1907 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1913 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1915 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1918 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1922 rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
1927 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
1928 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1929 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1931 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
1932 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
1933 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1934 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1936 case 0: /* Close log */
1937 case 1: /* Open log */
1938 case 2: /* Read from log */
1939 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1940 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
1942 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1949 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1950 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1951 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1953 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
1954 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
1955 * the capability is granted.
1957 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1958 * processes that allocate mappings.
1960 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
1962 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1963 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1965 rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
1967 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1968 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
1969 CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
1976 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
1979 /* binprm security operations */
1981 static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1983 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1985 bsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
1989 bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1992 bprm->security = bsec;
1996 static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1998 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1999 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2000 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2001 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2003 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2006 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
2010 bsec = bprm->security;
2015 tsec = current->security;
2016 isec = inode->i_security;
2018 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2019 bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
2021 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2022 tsec->create_sid = 0;
2023 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2024 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2026 if (tsec->exec_sid) {
2027 newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
2028 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2031 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2032 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2033 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
2038 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2039 ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2041 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2044 if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
2045 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2046 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2050 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2051 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
2052 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2056 rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid,
2057 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2061 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2062 current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2064 /* Set the security field to the new SID. */
2072 static int selinux_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2074 return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
2078 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2080 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2083 if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) {
2084 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2085 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2086 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2087 atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid,
2089 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2092 return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2095 static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2097 kfree(bprm->security);
2098 bprm->security = NULL;
2101 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2102 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2104 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2105 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct *files)
2107 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2108 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2109 struct tty_struct *tty;
2110 struct fdtable *fdt;
2114 mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
2115 tty = get_current_tty();
2118 file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_u.fu_list);
2120 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2121 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2122 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2123 file may belong to another process and we are only
2124 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2125 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2126 if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2127 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2133 mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
2134 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2138 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2140 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2142 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2144 unsigned long set, i;
2149 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2150 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2152 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2155 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2156 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2161 if (file_has_perm(current,
2163 file_to_av(file))) {
2165 fd = get_unused_fd();
2175 devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR);
2176 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2183 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2188 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2191 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2194 static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
2196 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2197 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2201 secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
2203 tsec = current->security;
2205 bsec = bprm->security;
2208 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
2210 if (tsec->sid != sid) {
2211 /* Check for shared state. If not ok, leave SID
2212 unchanged and kill. */
2213 if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2214 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2215 PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
2222 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
2223 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
2224 if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2225 struct task_struct *tracer;
2226 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2230 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
2231 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2232 sec = tracer->security;
2238 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2239 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2251 * called after apply_creds without the task lock held
2253 static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2255 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2256 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2257 struct itimerval itimer;
2258 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2261 tsec = current->security;
2262 bsec = bprm->security;
2265 force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current);
2268 if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid)
2271 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2272 flush_unauthorized_files(current->files);
2274 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state
2275 from the old SID. If not, clear itimers to avoid
2276 subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock
2277 signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has
2278 been updated so that any kill done after the flush
2279 will be checked against the new SID. */
2280 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2281 PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2283 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2284 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2285 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2286 flush_signals(current);
2287 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2288 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2289 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2290 recalc_sigpending();
2291 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2294 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2295 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2297 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits
2298 from the old SID. If not, reset all soft limits to
2299 the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init
2300 task's soft limit. Note that the setting of hard limits
2301 (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit
2302 check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into
2303 the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher
2304 than the default soft limit for cases where the default
2305 is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or
2307 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2308 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2310 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2311 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2312 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
2313 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2315 if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) {
2317 * This will cause RLIMIT_CPU calculations
2320 current->it_prof_expires = jiffies_to_cputime(1);
2324 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
2325 recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */
2326 wake_up_interruptible(¤t->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
2329 /* superblock security operations */
2331 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2333 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2336 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2338 superblock_free_security(sb);
2341 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2346 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2349 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2351 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2352 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2353 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2354 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len));
2357 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2364 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2368 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2371 int current_size = 0;
2379 while (current_size < len) {
2389 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2391 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2392 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2393 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2399 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2407 in_save = in_end = orig;
2411 open_quote = !open_quote;
2412 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2414 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2416 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2417 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2419 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2421 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2423 } while (*in_end++);
2425 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2426 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2431 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2433 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2436 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2440 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2441 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2442 return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2445 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2447 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2449 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2450 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2451 return superblock_has_perm(current, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2454 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2457 unsigned long flags,
2462 rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
2466 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2467 return superblock_has_perm(current, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2468 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2470 return dentry_has_perm(current, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2474 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2478 rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
2482 return superblock_has_perm(current, mnt->mnt_sb,
2483 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2486 /* inode security operations */
2488 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2490 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2493 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2495 inode_free_security(inode);
2498 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2499 char **name, void **value,
2502 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2503 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2504 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2507 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2509 tsec = current->security;
2510 dsec = dir->i_security;
2511 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2513 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
2514 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2516 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
2517 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2520 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2521 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2524 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2529 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2530 if (sbsec->initialized) {
2531 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2532 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2534 isec->initialized = 1;
2537 if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2541 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2548 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2560 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2562 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2565 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2569 rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
2572 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2575 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2579 rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2582 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2585 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2587 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2590 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2592 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2595 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2597 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2600 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2604 rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2608 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2611 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2612 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2614 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2617 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2619 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2622 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2626 rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, nameidata);
2629 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2632 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2636 rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask);
2641 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2645 return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2646 open_file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2649 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2653 rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2657 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2660 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2661 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2662 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2664 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2667 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2669 return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2672 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2674 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2675 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2676 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2677 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2679 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2680 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2681 Restrict to administrator. */
2686 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2687 ordinary setattr permission. */
2688 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2691 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2692 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2694 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2695 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2696 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2697 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2698 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2702 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2703 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2705 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2706 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2709 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2712 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2713 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2715 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2716 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2720 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2721 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2722 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2724 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2729 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2730 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2734 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid,
2739 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2741 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2742 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2746 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2747 const void *value, size_t size,
2750 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2751 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2755 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2756 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2760 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2762 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2763 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2764 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2772 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2774 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2777 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2779 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2782 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2784 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2785 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2787 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2788 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2793 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2795 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2797 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2801 char *context = NULL;
2802 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2803 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2805 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2809 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2810 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2811 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2812 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2813 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2814 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2815 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2817 error = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_MAC_ADMIN);
2819 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
2820 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2,
2821 CAPABILITY2__MAC_ADMIN,
2825 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2828 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2841 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2842 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2844 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2848 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2851 if (!value || !size)
2854 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2862 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2864 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2865 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2866 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2870 static int selinux_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2872 return secondary_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
2875 static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2877 return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
2880 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2882 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2886 /* file security operations */
2888 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2891 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2894 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2898 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2899 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2902 rc = file_has_perm(current, file,
2903 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2907 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2910 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2912 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2913 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2914 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2915 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2918 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2922 if (tsec->sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid
2923 && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2924 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2926 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2929 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2931 return file_alloc_security(file);
2934 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2936 file_free_security(file);
2939 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2944 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
2946 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
2951 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2954 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2956 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2957 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
2959 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2960 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2961 * This has an additional check.
2963 int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
2970 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2971 u32 av = FILE__READ;
2973 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2974 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
2977 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
2978 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2980 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2985 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
2986 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
2987 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
2990 u32 sid = ((struct task_security_struct *)(current->security))->sid;
2992 if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
2993 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
2994 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
2995 if (rc || addr_only)
2998 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3001 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3002 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3005 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3006 unsigned long reqprot,
3011 rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
3015 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3018 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3019 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3021 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3022 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3023 rc = task_has_perm(current, current,
3025 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3026 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3027 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3028 rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3029 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3031 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3032 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3033 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3034 * modified content. This typically should only
3035 * occur for text relocations.
3037 rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file,
3045 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3048 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3050 return file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
3053 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3060 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3065 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3066 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__WRITE);
3075 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3076 err = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
3081 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3086 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3090 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
3097 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3099 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3100 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3102 tsec = current->security;
3103 fsec = file->f_security;
3104 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
3109 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3110 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3114 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3115 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3117 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3118 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3120 tsec = tsk->security;
3121 fsec = file->f_security;
3124 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3126 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3128 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, tsec->sid,
3129 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3132 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3134 return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file));
3137 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file)
3139 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3140 struct inode *inode;
3141 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3142 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3143 fsec = file->f_security;
3144 isec = inode->i_security;
3146 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3147 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3148 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3149 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3150 * struct as its SID.
3152 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3153 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3155 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3156 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3157 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3158 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3159 * new inode label or new policy.
3160 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3162 return inode_has_perm(current, inode, file_to_av(file), NULL);
3165 /* task security operations */
3167 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3171 rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
3175 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
3178 static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
3180 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
3183 tsec1 = current->security;
3185 rc = task_alloc_security(tsk);
3188 tsec2 = tsk->security;
3190 tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
3191 tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
3193 /* Retain the exec, fs, key, and sock SIDs across fork */
3194 tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid;
3195 tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
3196 tsec2->keycreate_sid = tsec1->keycreate_sid;
3197 tsec2->sockcreate_sid = tsec1->sockcreate_sid;
3202 static void selinux_task_free_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
3204 task_free_security(tsk);
3207 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3209 /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
3210 since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
3211 identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
3212 this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
3213 of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
3218 static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3220 return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0, id1, id2, flags);
3223 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
3225 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3229 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3231 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3234 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3236 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3239 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3241 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3244 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3246 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
3250 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
3252 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3256 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3260 rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
3264 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3267 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3271 rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3275 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3278 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3280 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3283 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3285 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
3288 rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
3292 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3293 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3294 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3295 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */
3296 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3297 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3302 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
3306 rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
3310 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3313 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3315 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3318 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3320 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3323 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3328 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3330 rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
3335 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3337 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3340 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3342 rc = task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
3346 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
3353 /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
3354 any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
3355 the state of the current process. */
3356 return secondary_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, rc_p);
3359 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3361 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3364 static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
3366 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3368 secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
3371 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
3372 tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3376 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3377 struct inode *inode)
3379 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
3380 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3382 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
3383 isec->initialized = 1;
3387 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3388 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3389 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3391 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3392 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3394 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3395 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3399 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3400 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3403 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3404 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3408 *proto = ih->protocol;
3410 switch (ih->protocol) {
3412 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3414 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3418 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3422 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3423 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3428 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3430 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3434 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3438 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3439 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3443 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3444 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3446 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3450 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3454 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3455 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3466 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3468 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3469 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3470 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3473 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3474 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3476 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3477 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3481 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3482 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3485 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3486 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3487 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3496 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3498 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3502 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3503 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3508 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3510 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3514 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3515 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3519 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3520 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3522 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3526 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3527 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3531 /* includes fragments */
3541 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3542 char **addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3546 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3548 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3551 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3552 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3555 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3557 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3560 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3561 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3570 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3571 " unable to parse packet\n");
3577 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3579 * @family: protocol family
3580 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3583 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3584 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3585 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3586 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3587 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3591 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3598 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3599 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3601 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3602 if (unlikely(err)) {
3604 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3605 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3612 /* socket security operations */
3613 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3616 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3617 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3618 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3621 tsec = task->security;
3622 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3624 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3627 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3628 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3629 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3635 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3636 int protocol, int kern)
3639 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3645 tsec = current->security;
3646 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3647 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
3648 socket_type_to_security_class(family, type,
3649 protocol), SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3655 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3656 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3659 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3660 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3661 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3664 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3666 tsec = current->security;
3667 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3668 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3669 isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : newsid;
3670 isec->initialized = 1;
3673 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3674 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3675 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3676 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
3682 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3683 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3684 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3686 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3691 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3696 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3697 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3698 * check the first address now.
3700 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3701 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3703 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3704 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3705 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3706 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3707 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3708 unsigned short snum;
3709 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3712 tsec = current->security;
3713 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3715 if (family == PF_INET) {
3716 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3717 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3718 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3720 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3721 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3722 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3728 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3730 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3731 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3735 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3736 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3737 ad.u.net.family = family;
3738 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3740 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3746 switch (isec->sclass) {
3747 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3748 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3751 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3752 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3755 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3756 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3760 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3764 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3768 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3769 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3770 ad.u.net.family = family;
3772 if (family == PF_INET)
3773 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3775 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3777 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3778 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3786 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3788 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3791 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3796 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3798 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3799 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3800 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3801 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3802 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3803 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3804 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3805 unsigned short snum;
3808 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3809 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3810 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3812 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3814 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3815 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3817 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3820 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3824 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3825 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3827 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3828 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3829 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3830 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3839 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3841 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3844 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3847 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3848 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3850 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3854 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3856 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3857 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3858 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3859 newisec->initialized = 1;
3864 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3869 rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3873 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
3876 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3877 int size, int flags)
3879 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3882 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3884 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3887 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3889 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3892 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
3896 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3900 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3903 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3906 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3909 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3911 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3914 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3915 struct socket *other,
3918 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3919 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3920 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3921 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3924 err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
3928 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3929 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3931 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3932 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3934 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3936 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3940 /* connecting socket */
3941 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3942 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3944 /* server child socket */
3945 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3946 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3947 err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
3952 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3953 struct socket *other)
3955 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3956 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3957 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3960 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3961 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3963 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3964 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3966 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3967 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
3974 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
3976 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
3982 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
3985 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
3986 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
3990 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
3993 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
3994 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
3997 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
3998 struct sk_buff *skb,
3999 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4004 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4006 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, recv_perm;
4007 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4009 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4010 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4013 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4014 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
4015 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
4016 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4018 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4019 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
4020 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
4021 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4023 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4024 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
4025 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
4026 recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4029 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
4030 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
4035 err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
4038 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4042 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4045 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4051 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4052 ntohs(ad->u.net.sport), &port_sid);
4053 if (unlikely(err)) {
4055 "SELinux: failure in"
4056 " selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(),"
4057 " network port label not found\n");
4060 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, recv_perm, ad);
4063 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4064 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4065 u16 family, char *addrp)
4068 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4070 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4072 if (selinux_compat_net)
4073 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, ad,
4076 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4081 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4082 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4085 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4086 SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, ad);
4088 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, ad);
4091 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, ad);
4097 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4100 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4101 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4102 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4103 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4106 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4109 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4110 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4113 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4114 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4115 ad.u.net.family = family;
4116 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4120 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4121 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4122 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4123 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4124 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4125 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
4128 if (netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled()) {
4131 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4134 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family,
4138 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4142 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4143 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4152 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4153 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4158 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4159 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4160 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4162 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4164 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4165 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
4166 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4167 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4169 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4174 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4179 if (scontext_len > len) {
4184 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4188 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4196 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4198 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4202 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4203 else if (skb && skb->sk)
4204 family = skb->sk->sk_family;
4208 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4209 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4211 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4214 *secid = peer_secid;
4215 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4220 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4222 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
4225 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4227 sk_free_security(sk);
4230 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4232 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
4233 struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
4235 newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
4236 newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4237 newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
4239 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec, newsk->sk_family);
4242 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4245 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4247 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4249 *secid = sksec->sid;
4253 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4255 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4256 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4258 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4259 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4260 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4261 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4263 selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(sk, parent);
4266 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4267 struct request_sock *req)
4269 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4274 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, sk->sk_family, &peersid);
4277 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4278 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4279 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4283 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4287 req->secid = newsid;
4288 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4292 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4293 const struct request_sock *req)
4295 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4297 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4298 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4299 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4300 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4301 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4302 time it will have been created and available. */
4304 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4305 * thread with access to newsksec */
4306 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
4309 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
4310 struct sk_buff *skb)
4312 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4314 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, sk->sk_family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4317 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4320 fl->secid = req->secid;
4323 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4327 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4328 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
4329 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4331 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4335 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4337 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4339 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4340 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4341 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4342 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4343 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
4344 if (!selinux_enforcing)
4354 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
4359 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4361 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4366 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4370 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4373 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4374 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4375 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4378 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4379 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4380 ad.u.net.family = family;
4381 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4384 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4388 if (selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4389 peer_sid, &ad) != 0)
4393 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4394 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4400 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4401 struct sk_buff *skb,
4402 const struct net_device *in,
4403 const struct net_device *out,
4404 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4406 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4409 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4410 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4411 struct sk_buff *skb,
4412 const struct net_device *in,
4413 const struct net_device *out,
4414 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4416 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4420 static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4422 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4423 u16 family, char *addrp)
4426 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4428 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, send_perm;
4429 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4431 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4432 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4435 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4436 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
4437 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
4438 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4440 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4441 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
4442 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
4443 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4445 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4446 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
4447 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
4448 send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4451 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
4452 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
4457 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4460 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4463 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4466 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4473 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4474 ntohs(ad->u.net.dport), &port_sid);
4475 if (unlikely(err)) {
4477 "SELinux: failure in"
4478 " selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(),"
4479 " network port label not found\n");
4482 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, send_perm, ad);
4485 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4487 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4492 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4493 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4497 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4499 if (selinux_compat_net) {
4500 if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex,
4504 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4505 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, ad))
4509 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4510 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, ad, proto))
4516 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4522 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4528 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4529 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4530 ad.u.net.family = family;
4531 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4534 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4535 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4536 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4537 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4538 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4539 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, &ad,
4540 family, addrp, proto);
4542 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4543 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4544 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4545 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4546 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4547 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4548 if (skb->dst != NULL && skb->dst->xfrm != NULL)
4551 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4552 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4553 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4556 /* if the packet is locally generated (skb->sk != NULL) then use the
4557 * socket's label as the peer label, otherwise the packet is being
4558 * forwarded through this system and we need to fetch the peer label
4559 * directly from the packet */
4562 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4563 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4564 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4566 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4568 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4572 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4573 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4576 if (peerlbl_active) {
4580 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4582 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4583 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4586 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4588 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4589 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4596 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4597 struct sk_buff *skb,
4598 const struct net_device *in,
4599 const struct net_device *out,
4600 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4602 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4605 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4606 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4607 struct sk_buff *skb,
4608 const struct net_device *in,
4609 const struct net_device *out,
4610 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4612 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4616 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4618 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4622 err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
4626 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
4627 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4632 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4635 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4637 err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4641 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4642 ad.u.cap = capability;
4644 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4645 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4648 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4649 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4652 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
4653 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4655 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4659 isec->sclass = sclass;
4660 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
4661 perm->security = isec;
4666 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4668 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4669 perm->security = NULL;
4673 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4675 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4677 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4681 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4682 msg->security = msec;
4687 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4689 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4691 msg->security = NULL;
4695 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4698 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4699 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4700 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4702 tsec = current->security;
4703 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4705 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4706 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4708 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4711 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4713 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4716 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4718 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4721 /* message queue security operations */
4722 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4724 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4725 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4726 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4729 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4733 tsec = current->security;
4734 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4736 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4737 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4739 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4742 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4748 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4750 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4753 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4755 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4756 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4757 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4759 tsec = current->security;
4760 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4762 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4763 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4765 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4766 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4769 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4777 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4778 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4781 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4784 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4787 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4793 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4797 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4799 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4800 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4801 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4802 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4805 tsec = current->security;
4806 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4807 msec = msg->security;
4810 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4812 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4814 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4815 * message queue this message will be stored in
4817 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
4825 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4826 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4828 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4829 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4832 /* Can this process send the message */
4833 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4834 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad);
4836 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4837 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid,
4838 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4843 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4844 struct task_struct *target,
4845 long type, int mode)
4847 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4848 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4849 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4850 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4853 tsec = target->security;
4854 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4855 msec = msg->security;
4857 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4858 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4860 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
4861 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4863 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4864 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4868 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4869 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4871 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4872 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4873 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4876 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
4880 tsec = current->security;
4881 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4883 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4884 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4886 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4889 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4895 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4897 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4900 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
4902 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4903 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4904 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4906 tsec = current->security;
4907 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4909 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4910 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4912 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4913 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4916 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
4917 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
4925 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4926 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4929 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
4932 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
4939 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
4945 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4949 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
4950 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
4955 rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
4959 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
4962 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
4964 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4967 /* Semaphore security operations */
4968 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4970 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4971 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4972 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4975 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
4979 tsec = current->security;
4980 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4982 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4983 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4985 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4988 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4994 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4996 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4999 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5001 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5002 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5003 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5005 tsec = current->security;
5006 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5008 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5009 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5011 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5012 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5015 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5016 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5024 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5025 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5029 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5040 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5043 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5047 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5053 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5057 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5058 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5063 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5067 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5070 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5076 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5078 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5083 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5086 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5088 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5092 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5095 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5098 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5099 char *name, char **value)
5101 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5107 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5114 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5116 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5118 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5119 sid = tsec->exec_sid;
5120 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5121 sid = tsec->create_sid;
5122 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5123 sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5124 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5125 sid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5132 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5138 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5139 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5141 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5142 struct task_struct *tracer;
5148 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5149 security attributes. */
5154 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5155 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5156 * above restriction is ever removed.
5158 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5159 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5160 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5161 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5162 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5163 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5164 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5165 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5166 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5167 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5173 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5174 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5175 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5179 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5180 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5181 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5183 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5190 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5191 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5192 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5193 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve
5194 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5195 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5197 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5198 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5199 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5200 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5201 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5202 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5205 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5206 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5207 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5208 else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5209 struct av_decision avd;
5214 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5215 if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) {
5216 struct task_struct *g, *t;
5217 struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
5218 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
5219 do_each_thread(g, t) {
5220 if (t->mm == mm && t != p) {
5221 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
5224 } while_each_thread(g, t);
5225 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
5228 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5229 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5230 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5234 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5235 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5238 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
5239 if (tracer != NULL) {
5240 struct task_security_struct *ptsec = tracer->security;
5241 u32 ptsid = ptsec->sid;
5243 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ptsid, sid,
5245 PROCESS__PTRACE, 0, &avd);
5249 avc_audit(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5250 PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL);
5264 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5266 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5269 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5271 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5274 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5281 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, struct task_struct *tsk,
5282 unsigned long flags)
5284 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
5285 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5287 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5291 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5292 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5294 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5300 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5302 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5308 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5309 struct task_struct *ctx,
5313 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5314 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5316 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5318 tsec = ctx->security;
5319 ksec = key->security;
5321 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5322 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5323 appear to be created. */
5327 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksec->sid,
5328 SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5331 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5333 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5334 char *context = NULL;
5338 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5347 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5350 .ptrace = selinux_ptrace,
5351 .capget = selinux_capget,
5352 .capset_check = selinux_capset_check,
5353 .capset_set = selinux_capset_set,
5354 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
5355 .capable = selinux_capable,
5356 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5357 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5358 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5359 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5361 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5362 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5364 .bprm_alloc_security = selinux_bprm_alloc_security,
5365 .bprm_free_security = selinux_bprm_free_security,
5366 .bprm_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_apply_creds,
5367 .bprm_post_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds,
5368 .bprm_set_security = selinux_bprm_set_security,
5369 .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security,
5370 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5372 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5373 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5374 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5375 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5376 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5377 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5378 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5379 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5380 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5381 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5382 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5385 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5386 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5387 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5388 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5389 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5390 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5391 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5392 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5393 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5394 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5395 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5396 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5397 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5398 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5399 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5400 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5401 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5402 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5403 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5404 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5405 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5406 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5407 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5408 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5409 .inode_need_killpriv = selinux_inode_need_killpriv,
5410 .inode_killpriv = selinux_inode_killpriv,
5411 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5413 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5414 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5415 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5416 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5417 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5418 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5419 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5420 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5421 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5422 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5423 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5425 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5427 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5428 .task_alloc_security = selinux_task_alloc_security,
5429 .task_free_security = selinux_task_free_security,
5430 .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
5431 .task_post_setuid = selinux_task_post_setuid,
5432 .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
5433 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5434 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5435 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5436 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5437 .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
5438 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5439 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5440 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5441 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5442 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5443 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5444 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5445 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5446 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5447 .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
5448 .task_reparent_to_init = selinux_task_reparent_to_init,
5449 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5451 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5452 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5454 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5455 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5457 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5458 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5459 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5460 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5461 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5462 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5464 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5465 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5466 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5467 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5468 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5470 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5471 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5472 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5473 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5474 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5476 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5478 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5479 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5481 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5482 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5483 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5485 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5486 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5488 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5489 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5490 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5491 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5492 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5493 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5494 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5495 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5496 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5497 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5498 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5499 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5500 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5501 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5502 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5503 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5504 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5505 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5506 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5507 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5508 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5509 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5510 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5511 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5512 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5514 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5515 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5516 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5517 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5518 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5519 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5520 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5521 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5522 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5523 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5524 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5528 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5529 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5530 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5531 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5535 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5536 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5537 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5538 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5542 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5544 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5546 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5547 selinux_enabled = 0;
5551 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5552 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5556 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5558 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5559 if (task_alloc_security(current))
5560 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
5561 tsec = current->security;
5562 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5564 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5565 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5566 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5569 secondary_ops = security_ops;
5571 panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5572 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5573 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5575 if (selinux_enforcing)
5576 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5578 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5583 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5585 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5587 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5588 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5589 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5590 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5592 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
5593 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
5594 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
5595 struct superblock_security_struct,
5597 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
5599 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5600 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5601 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
5603 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5605 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5606 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5607 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
5610 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5611 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5614 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5615 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5616 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5618 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5620 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5622 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5623 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5625 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5626 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5629 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5630 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5632 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5633 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5637 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5639 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5641 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5642 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5644 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5645 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5648 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5649 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5651 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5652 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5658 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5662 if (!selinux_enabled)
5665 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5667 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5669 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5671 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5672 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5674 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5681 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5683 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5684 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5686 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5688 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5689 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5690 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5695 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5697 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5698 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5701 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5703 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5704 static int selinux_disabled;
5706 int selinux_disable(void)
5708 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5710 if (ss_initialized) {
5711 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5715 if (selinux_disabled) {
5716 /* Only do this once. */
5720 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5722 selinux_disabled = 1;
5723 selinux_enabled = 0;
5725 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5726 security_ops = secondary_ops;
5728 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5729 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5731 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */