2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel.h>
28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
29 #include <linux/errno.h>
30 #include <linux/sched.h>
31 #include <linux/security.h>
32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
33 #include <linux/capability.h>
34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
36 #include <linux/mman.h>
37 #include <linux/slab.h>
38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
39 #include <linux/swap.h>
40 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
41 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
42 #include <linux/file.h>
43 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
44 #include <linux/namei.h>
45 #include <linux/mount.h>
46 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
54 #include <net/netlabel.h>
55 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
56 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
57 #include <asm/atomic.h>
58 #include <linux/bitops.h>
59 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
60 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/tcp.h>
63 #include <linux/udp.h>
64 #include <linux/dccp.h>
65 #include <linux/quota.h>
66 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
67 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
68 #include <linux/parser.h>
69 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
71 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
72 #include <linux/personality.h>
73 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
74 #include <linux/audit.h>
75 #include <linux/string.h>
76 #include <linux/selinux.h>
77 #include <linux/mutex.h>
78 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
89 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
90 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
92 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
94 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
95 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
96 extern int selinux_compat_net;
97 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
99 /* SECMARK reference count */
100 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
102 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
103 int selinux_enforcing;
105 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
107 unsigned long enforcing;
108 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
109 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
112 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
115 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
116 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
118 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
120 unsigned long enabled;
121 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
122 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
125 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
127 int selinux_enabled = 1;
132 * Minimal support for a secondary security module,
133 * just to allow the use of the capability module.
135 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
137 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
138 before the policy was loaded. */
139 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
140 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
142 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
145 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
148 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
149 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
150 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
151 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
154 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
156 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
160 * initialise the security for the init task
162 static void cred_init_security(void)
164 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
165 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
167 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
169 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
171 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
172 cred->security = tsec;
176 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
178 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
180 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
182 tsec = cred->security;
187 * get the objective security ID of a task
189 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
194 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
200 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
202 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
204 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_cred()->security;
209 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
211 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
213 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
214 u32 sid = current_sid();
216 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
220 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
221 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
223 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
224 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
225 isec->task_sid = sid;
226 inode->i_security = isec;
231 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
233 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
234 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
236 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
237 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
238 list_del_init(&isec->list);
239 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
241 inode->i_security = NULL;
242 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
245 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
247 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
248 u32 sid = current_sid();
250 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
255 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
256 file->f_security = fsec;
261 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
263 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
264 file->f_security = NULL;
268 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
270 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
272 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
276 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
277 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
278 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
279 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
281 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
282 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
283 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
284 sb->s_security = sbsec;
289 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
291 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
293 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
294 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
295 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
296 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
298 sb->s_security = NULL;
302 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
304 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
306 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
310 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
311 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
312 sk->sk_security = ssec;
314 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec, family);
319 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
321 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
323 sk->sk_security = NULL;
324 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssec);
328 /* The security server must be initialized before
329 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
330 extern int ss_initialized;
332 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
334 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
336 "uses transition SIDs",
338 "uses genfs_contexts",
339 "not configured for labeling",
340 "uses mountpoint labeling",
343 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
345 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
347 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
356 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
359 static const match_table_t tokens = {
360 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
361 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
362 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
363 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
364 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
368 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
370 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
371 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
372 const struct cred *cred)
374 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
377 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
378 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
382 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
383 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
387 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
388 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
389 const struct cred *cred)
391 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
393 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
394 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
398 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
399 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
403 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
405 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
406 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
407 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
410 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
411 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
412 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
413 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
414 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
415 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
416 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
417 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
418 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
422 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
423 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
424 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
425 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
426 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
427 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
429 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
430 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
431 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
436 sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
438 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
439 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
440 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
442 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
443 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
444 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
446 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS ||
447 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
448 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
449 sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
450 sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
452 /* Initialize the root inode. */
453 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
455 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
456 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
457 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
459 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
461 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
462 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
463 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
464 struct inode_security_struct, list);
465 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
466 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
467 inode = igrab(inode);
469 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
473 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
474 list_del_init(&isec->list);
477 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
483 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
484 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
485 * mount options, or whatever.
487 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
488 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
491 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
492 char *context = NULL;
496 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
498 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
504 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
505 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
506 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
508 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
511 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
512 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
513 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
515 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
516 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
521 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
522 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
528 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
529 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
532 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
533 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
535 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
536 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
539 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
540 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
542 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
543 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
546 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
547 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
549 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
550 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
551 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
553 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
556 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
557 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
559 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) {
560 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
561 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP;
564 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
569 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
573 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
574 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
576 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
578 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
579 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
580 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
581 (old_sid != new_sid))
584 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
585 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
587 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
588 if (mnt_flags & flag)
594 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
595 * labeling information.
597 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
598 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
600 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
602 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
603 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
604 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
605 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
606 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
607 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
608 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
609 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
610 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
612 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
614 if (!ss_initialized) {
616 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
617 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
618 server is ready to handle calls. */
619 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
620 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
621 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
622 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
626 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
627 "before the security server is initialized\n");
632 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
633 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
634 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
635 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
637 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
638 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
639 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
640 * will be used for both mounts)
642 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
647 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
648 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
649 * than once with different security options.
651 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
654 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
656 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
657 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
659 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
660 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
661 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
668 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
670 goto out_double_mount;
672 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
677 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
679 goto out_double_mount;
681 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
683 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
684 rootcontext_sid = sid;
686 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
688 goto out_double_mount;
690 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
694 defcontext_sid = sid;
696 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
698 goto out_double_mount;
700 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
709 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
710 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
711 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
712 goto out_double_mount;
717 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
718 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
720 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
721 rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
723 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
724 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
728 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
730 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
734 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
738 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
739 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
740 * the superblock context if not already set.
743 if (!fscontext_sid) {
744 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
748 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
750 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
755 if (!rootcontext_sid)
756 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
758 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
759 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
762 if (rootcontext_sid) {
763 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
768 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
769 root_isec->initialized = 1;
772 if (defcontext_sid) {
773 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
775 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
776 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
780 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
781 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
787 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
790 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
792 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
796 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
797 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
801 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
802 struct super_block *newsb)
804 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
805 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
807 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
808 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
809 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
812 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
813 * mount options. thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
816 if (!ss_initialized) {
817 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
818 if (list_empty(&newsbsec->list))
819 list_add(&newsbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
820 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
824 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
825 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
827 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
828 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
831 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
833 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
835 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
836 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
837 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
840 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
844 if (!set_rootcontext) {
845 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
846 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
849 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
851 if (set_rootcontext) {
852 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
853 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
854 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
855 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
857 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
860 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
861 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
864 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
865 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
868 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
869 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
870 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
872 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
874 /* Standard string-based options. */
875 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
877 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
882 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
886 if (context || defcontext) {
888 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
891 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
901 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
904 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
911 case Opt_rootcontext:
914 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
917 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
925 if (context || defcontext) {
927 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
930 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
936 case Opt_labelsupport:
940 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
947 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
951 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
952 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
953 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
958 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
959 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
962 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
963 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
966 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
967 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
970 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
971 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
974 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
985 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
987 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
990 char *options = data;
991 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
993 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
998 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
1000 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
1005 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1008 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1012 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
1013 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
1018 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
1021 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
1022 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
1026 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
1028 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
1031 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
1033 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
1034 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
1036 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
1037 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
1039 case SE_SBLABELSUPP:
1041 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
1046 /* we need a comma before each option */
1048 seq_puts(m, prefix);
1051 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1057 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1059 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1062 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1064 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1070 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1072 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1077 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1079 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1081 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1083 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1085 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1087 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1089 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1091 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1093 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1097 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1100 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1102 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1105 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1107 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1110 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1116 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1117 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1119 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1126 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1127 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1129 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1131 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1132 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1134 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1136 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1138 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1144 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1145 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1146 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1147 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1148 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1150 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1152 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1153 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1154 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1156 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1157 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1158 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1159 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1160 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1161 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1162 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1164 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1167 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1169 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1171 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1174 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1177 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1178 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1183 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1185 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1190 end = buffer+buflen;
1195 while (de && de != de->parent) {
1196 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1200 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1205 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1206 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1210 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1218 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1219 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1221 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1222 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1224 struct dentry *dentry;
1225 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1226 char *context = NULL;
1230 if (isec->initialized)
1233 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1234 if (isec->initialized)
1237 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1238 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1239 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1240 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1241 server is ready to handle calls. */
1242 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1243 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1244 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1245 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1249 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1250 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1251 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1252 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1256 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1257 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1259 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1260 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1262 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1263 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1266 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: no dentry for dev=%s "
1267 "ino=%ld\n", __func__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
1272 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1273 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1279 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1281 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1282 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1283 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1291 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1297 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1303 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1304 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1305 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1306 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1310 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1311 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1314 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1318 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1319 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1320 __func__, context, -rc,
1321 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1323 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1331 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1332 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1334 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1335 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1336 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1338 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1339 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1340 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1348 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1349 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1352 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1353 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1355 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1356 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1358 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1359 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1370 isec->initialized = 1;
1373 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1375 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1376 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1380 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1381 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1387 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1388 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1391 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1392 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1395 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1396 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1399 /* All other signals. */
1400 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1408 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1409 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1411 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1412 const struct cred *target,
1415 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1417 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1421 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1422 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1423 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1424 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1426 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1427 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1430 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1434 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1435 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1437 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1441 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1442 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1443 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1444 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1446 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1451 sid = current_sid();
1452 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1453 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1456 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1457 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1460 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1461 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1462 const struct cred *cred,
1465 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1466 struct av_decision avd;
1468 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1469 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1472 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1476 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1478 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1481 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1485 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1489 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1490 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT)
1491 avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1495 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1496 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1499 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1501 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1502 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1505 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1506 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1507 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1508 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1509 struct inode *inode,
1511 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1513 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1514 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1517 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1520 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1521 isec = inode->i_security;
1525 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1526 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1529 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1532 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1533 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1534 pathname if needed. */
1535 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1536 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1537 struct dentry *dentry,
1540 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1541 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1543 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1544 ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1545 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1546 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1549 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1550 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1551 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1552 check a particular permission to the file.
1553 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1554 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1555 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1556 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1557 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1561 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1562 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1563 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1564 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1567 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1568 ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1570 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1571 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1579 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1582 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1588 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1589 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1590 struct dentry *dentry,
1593 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1594 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
1595 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1596 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1598 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1601 dsec = dir->i_security;
1602 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1605 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1607 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1608 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1610 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1611 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1616 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
1617 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, &newsid);
1622 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1626 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1627 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1628 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1631 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1632 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1633 struct task_struct *ctx)
1635 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1637 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1641 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1644 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1645 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1646 struct dentry *dentry,
1650 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1651 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1652 u32 sid = current_sid();
1656 dsec = dir->i_security;
1657 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1659 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1660 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1663 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1664 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1679 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1684 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1688 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1689 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1690 struct inode *new_dir,
1691 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1693 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1694 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1695 u32 sid = current_sid();
1697 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1700 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1701 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1702 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1703 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1705 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1707 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1708 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1709 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1712 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1713 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1716 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1717 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1718 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1723 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1724 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1725 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1726 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1727 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1730 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1731 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1732 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1733 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1735 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1743 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1744 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1745 struct super_block *sb,
1747 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1749 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1750 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1752 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1753 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1756 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1757 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1761 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1762 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1763 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1764 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1767 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1769 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1773 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1775 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1777 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1784 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1785 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1789 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1791 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1792 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1799 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1808 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1811 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1813 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1815 if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
1816 mode_t mode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode;
1818 * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1822 else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
1823 av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
1824 else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
1825 av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
1826 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
1827 av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
1828 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
1831 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1832 "unknown mode:%o\n", __func__, mode);
1837 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1839 static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
1844 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
1848 if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1849 u32 sid = current_sid();
1850 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1851 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1854 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1857 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1861 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_traceme(parent);
1865 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1868 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1869 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1873 error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1877 return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1880 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1881 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1882 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1883 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1887 error = secondary_ops->capset(new, old,
1888 effective, inheritable, permitted);
1892 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1895 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
1900 rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1904 return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1907 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1910 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1913 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1918 end = buffer+buflen;
1924 const char *name = table->procname;
1925 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1926 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1930 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1933 table = table->parent;
1939 memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1941 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1943 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1948 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1955 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1959 sid = current_sid();
1961 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1962 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1964 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1965 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1968 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1969 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1971 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
1972 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1980 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
1981 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1987 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1989 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2001 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2006 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2009 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2015 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2017 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2019 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2022 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2026 rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
2031 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
2032 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2033 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
2035 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
2036 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
2037 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2038 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
2040 case 0: /* Close log */
2041 case 1: /* Open log */
2042 case 2: /* Read from log */
2043 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
2044 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
2046 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
2053 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2054 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2055 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2057 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
2058 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
2059 * the capability is granted.
2061 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2062 * processes that allocate mappings.
2064 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2066 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2068 rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2069 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2073 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
2076 /* binprm security operations */
2078 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2080 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2081 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2082 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2083 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2084 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2087 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_creds(bprm);
2091 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2092 * the script interpreter */
2093 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
2096 old_tsec = current_security();
2097 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2098 isec = inode->i_security;
2100 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2101 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2102 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2104 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2105 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2106 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2107 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2109 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2110 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2111 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2112 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2114 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2115 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2116 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &new_tsec->sid);
2121 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2122 ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2124 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2125 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2127 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2128 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2129 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2133 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2134 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2135 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2139 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2140 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2144 /* Check for shared state */
2145 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2146 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2147 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2153 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2154 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2156 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2157 struct task_struct *tracer;
2158 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2162 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
2163 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2164 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2170 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2172 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2178 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2179 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2185 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2187 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2188 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2196 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2197 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2198 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2199 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2201 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2204 return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2207 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2208 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2210 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2211 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2212 struct files_struct *files)
2214 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2215 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2216 struct tty_struct *tty;
2217 struct fdtable *fdt;
2221 tty = get_current_tty();
2224 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2225 struct inode *inode;
2227 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2228 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2229 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2230 file may belong to another process and we are only
2231 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2232 file = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct file, f_u.fu_list);
2233 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2234 if (inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2235 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2242 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2246 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2248 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2250 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2252 unsigned long set, i;
2257 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2258 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2260 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2263 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2264 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2269 if (file_has_perm(cred,
2271 file_to_av(file))) {
2273 fd = get_unused_fd();
2283 devnull = dentry_open(
2285 mntget(selinuxfs_mount),
2287 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2294 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2299 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2302 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2306 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2308 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2310 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2311 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2314 secondary_ops->bprm_committing_creds(bprm);
2316 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2317 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2320 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2321 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2323 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2324 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2326 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2327 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2328 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2330 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2331 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2332 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2333 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2334 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2336 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2337 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2339 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2340 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2341 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2342 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2344 update_rlimit_cpu(rlim->rlim_cur);
2349 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2352 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2354 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2355 struct itimerval itimer;
2356 struct sighand_struct *psig;
2359 unsigned long flags;
2361 secondary_ops->bprm_committed_creds(bprm);
2369 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2370 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2371 * flush and unblock signals.
2373 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2374 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2376 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2378 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2379 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2380 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2381 flush_signals(current);
2382 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2383 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2384 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2385 recalc_sigpending();
2386 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2389 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2390 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2391 read_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2392 psig = current->parent->sighand;
2393 spin_lock_irqsave(&psig->siglock, flags);
2394 wake_up_interruptible(¤t->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
2395 spin_unlock_irqrestore(&psig->siglock, flags);
2396 read_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2399 /* superblock security operations */
2401 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2403 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2406 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2408 superblock_free_security(sb);
2411 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2416 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2419 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2421 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2422 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2423 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2424 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2425 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2428 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2435 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2439 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2442 int current_size = 0;
2450 while (current_size < len) {
2460 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2462 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2463 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2464 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2470 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2478 in_save = in_end = orig;
2482 open_quote = !open_quote;
2483 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2485 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2487 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2488 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2490 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2492 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2494 } while (*in_end++);
2496 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2497 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2502 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2504 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2505 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2508 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2512 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2513 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2516 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2517 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2518 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2521 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2523 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2524 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2526 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2527 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2528 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2531 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2534 unsigned long flags,
2537 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2540 rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
2544 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2545 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2546 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2548 return dentry_has_perm(cred, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2552 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2554 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2557 rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
2561 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2562 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2565 /* inode security operations */
2567 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2569 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2572 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2574 inode_free_security(inode);
2577 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2578 char **name, void **value,
2581 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2582 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2583 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2584 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2585 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2587 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2589 dsec = dir->i_security;
2590 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2593 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2595 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
2596 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2597 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2600 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2601 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2604 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2609 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2610 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2611 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2612 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2614 isec->initialized = 1;
2617 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2621 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2628 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2640 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2642 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2645 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2649 rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
2652 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2655 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2659 rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2662 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2665 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2667 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2670 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2672 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2675 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2677 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2680 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2684 rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2688 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2691 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2692 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2694 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2697 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2699 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2701 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2704 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2706 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2709 rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, nameidata);
2712 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2715 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2717 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2720 rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask);
2725 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2729 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2730 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2733 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2735 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2738 rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2742 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2745 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2746 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2747 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2749 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2752 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2754 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2756 return dentry_has_perm(cred, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2759 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2761 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2763 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2764 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2765 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2766 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2768 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2769 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2770 Restrict to administrator. */
2775 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2776 ordinary setattr permission. */
2777 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2780 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2781 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2783 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2784 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2785 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2786 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2787 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2790 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2791 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2793 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2794 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2797 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2800 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2801 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2803 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2804 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2808 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2809 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2810 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2812 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2817 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2818 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2822 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
2827 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2829 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2830 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2834 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2835 const void *value, size_t size,
2838 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2839 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2843 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2844 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2848 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2850 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2851 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2852 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2860 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2862 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2864 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2867 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2869 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2871 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2874 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2876 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2877 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2879 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2880 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2885 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2887 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2889 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2893 char *context = NULL;
2894 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2896 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2900 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2901 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2902 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2903 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2904 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2905 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2906 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2908 error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
2909 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2911 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2914 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2927 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2928 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2930 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2934 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2937 if (!value || !size)
2940 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2948 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2950 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2951 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2952 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2956 static int selinux_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2958 return secondary_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
2961 static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2963 return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
2966 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2968 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2972 /* file security operations */
2974 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2976 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2978 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2981 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2985 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2986 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2989 rc = file_has_perm(cred, file,
2990 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2994 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2997 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2999 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3000 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
3001 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3002 u32 sid = current_sid();
3005 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3009 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid
3010 && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
3011 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
3013 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
3016 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
3018 return file_alloc_security(file);
3021 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
3023 file_free_security(file);
3026 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3029 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3032 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
3034 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
3039 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3042 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3044 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3047 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3048 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3050 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3051 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3052 * This has an additional check.
3054 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3061 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3062 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3064 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3065 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3068 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3069 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3071 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3078 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3079 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
3080 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
3083 u32 sid = current_sid();
3085 if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
3086 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3087 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3088 if (rc || addr_only)
3091 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3094 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3095 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3098 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3099 unsigned long reqprot,
3102 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3105 rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
3109 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3112 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3113 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3115 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3116 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3117 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3118 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3119 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3120 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3121 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3122 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3124 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3125 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3126 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3127 * modified content. This typically should only
3128 * occur for text relocations.
3130 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3137 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3140 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3142 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3144 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3147 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3150 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3155 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3160 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3161 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3170 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3171 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3176 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3181 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3185 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3192 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3194 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3196 fsec = file->f_security;
3197 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3202 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3203 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3206 u32 sid = current_sid();
3208 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3210 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3211 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3213 fsec = file->f_security;
3216 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3218 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3220 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3221 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3224 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3226 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3228 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3231 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3233 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3234 struct inode *inode;
3235 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3237 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3238 fsec = file->f_security;
3239 isec = inode->i_security;
3241 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3242 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3243 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3244 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3245 * struct as its SID.
3247 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3248 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3250 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3251 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3252 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3253 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3254 * new inode label or new policy.
3255 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3257 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL);
3260 /* task security operations */
3262 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3266 rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
3270 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3274 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3276 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3278 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3279 cred->security = NULL;
3284 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3286 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3289 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3290 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3292 old_tsec = old->security;
3294 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3298 new->security = tsec;
3303 * commit new credentials
3305 static void selinux_cred_commit(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3307 secondary_ops->cred_commit(new, old);
3311 * set the security data for a kernel service
3312 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3314 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3316 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3317 u32 sid = current_sid();
3320 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3321 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3322 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3326 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3327 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3328 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3334 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3335 * objective context of the specified inode
3337 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3339 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3340 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3341 u32 sid = current_sid();
3344 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3345 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3346 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3350 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3354 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3356 /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
3357 since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
3358 identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
3359 this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
3360 of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
3365 static int selinux_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3368 return secondary_ops->task_fix_setuid(new, old, flags);
3371 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
3373 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3377 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3379 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3382 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3384 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3387 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3389 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3392 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3394 *secid = task_sid(p);
3397 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
3399 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3403 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3407 rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
3411 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3414 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3418 rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3422 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3425 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3427 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3430 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3432 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
3435 rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
3439 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3440 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3441 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3442 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3443 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3444 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3449 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
3453 rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
3457 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3460 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3462 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3465 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3467 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3470 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3476 rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
3481 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3483 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3485 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3486 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3488 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3492 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
3498 /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
3499 any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
3500 the state of the current process. */
3501 return secondary_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
3504 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3506 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3509 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3510 struct inode *inode)
3512 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3513 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3516 isec->initialized = 1;
3519 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3520 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3521 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3523 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3524 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3526 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3527 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3531 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3532 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3535 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3536 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3540 *proto = ih->protocol;
3542 switch (ih->protocol) {
3544 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3546 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3550 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3554 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3555 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3560 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3562 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3566 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3570 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3571 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3575 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3576 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3578 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3582 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3586 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3587 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3598 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3600 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3601 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3602 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3605 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3606 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3608 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3609 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3613 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3614 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3617 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3618 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3619 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3628 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3630 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3634 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3635 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3640 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3642 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3646 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3647 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3651 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3652 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3654 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3658 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3659 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3663 /* includes fragments */
3673 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3674 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3679 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3681 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3684 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3685 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3688 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3690 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3693 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3694 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3704 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3705 " unable to parse packet\n");
3715 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3717 * @family: protocol family
3718 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3721 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3722 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3723 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3724 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3725 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3729 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3736 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3737 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3739 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3740 if (unlikely(err)) {
3742 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3743 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3750 /* socket security operations */
3751 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3754 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3755 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3759 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3761 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3763 sid = task_sid(task);
3765 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3766 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3767 err = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3773 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3774 int protocol, int kern)
3776 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3777 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3786 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ?: sid;
3788 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3789 err = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3795 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3796 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3798 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3799 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3800 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3801 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3806 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
3808 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3811 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3817 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3818 isec->initialized = 1;
3821 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3822 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3823 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3824 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
3830 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3831 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3832 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3834 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3839 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3844 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3845 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3846 * check the first address now.
3848 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3849 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3851 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3852 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3853 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3854 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3855 unsigned short snum;
3856 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3859 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3861 if (family == PF_INET) {
3862 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3863 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3864 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3866 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3867 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3868 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3874 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3876 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3877 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3881 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3882 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3883 ad.u.net.family = family;
3884 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3886 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3892 switch (isec->sclass) {
3893 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3894 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3897 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3898 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3901 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3902 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3906 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3910 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3914 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3915 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3916 ad.u.net.family = family;
3918 if (family == PF_INET)
3919 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3921 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3923 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3924 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3932 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3934 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3935 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3938 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3943 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3945 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3946 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3947 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3948 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3949 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3950 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3951 unsigned short snum;
3954 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3955 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3956 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3958 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3960 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3961 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3963 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3966 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3970 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3971 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3973 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3974 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3975 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3976 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3981 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3987 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3989 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3992 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3995 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3996 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3998 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
4002 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
4004 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4005 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4006 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
4007 newisec->initialized = 1;
4012 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4017 rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
4021 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
4024 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4025 int size, int flags)
4027 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
4030 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
4032 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4035 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
4037 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4040 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4044 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4048 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4051 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4054 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4057 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4059 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4062 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
4063 struct socket *other,
4066 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4067 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4068 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
4069 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4072 err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
4076 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4077 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
4079 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4080 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
4082 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
4084 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4088 /* connecting socket */
4089 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4090 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
4092 /* server child socket */
4093 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
4094 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
4095 err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
4100 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4101 struct socket *other)
4103 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4104 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
4105 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4108 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4109 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
4111 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4112 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
4114 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
4115 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
4122 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
4124 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
4130 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4133 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4134 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4138 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4141 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4142 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4145 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4146 struct sk_buff *skb,
4147 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4152 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4154 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, recv_perm;
4155 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4157 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4158 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4161 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4162 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
4163 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
4164 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4166 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4167 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
4168 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
4169 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4171 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4172 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
4173 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
4174 recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4177 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
4178 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
4183 err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
4186 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4190 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4193 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4199 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4200 ntohs(ad->u.net.sport), &port_sid);
4201 if (unlikely(err)) {
4203 "SELinux: failure in"
4204 " selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(),"
4205 " network port label not found\n");
4208 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, recv_perm, ad);
4211 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4215 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4217 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4218 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4221 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4222 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4223 ad.u.net.family = family;
4224 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4228 if (selinux_compat_net)
4229 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
4231 else if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4232 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4237 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4238 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4241 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4242 SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad);
4244 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4246 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4249 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4255 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4258 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4259 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4260 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4261 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4266 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4269 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4270 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4273 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4274 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4275 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4276 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4277 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4278 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4280 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4281 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4282 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4285 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4286 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4287 ad.u.net.family = family;
4288 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4292 if (peerlbl_active) {
4295 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4298 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family,
4301 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4304 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4307 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4310 if (secmark_active) {
4311 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4320 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4321 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4326 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4327 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4328 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4330 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4332 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4333 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
4334 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4335 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4337 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4342 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4347 if (scontext_len > len) {
4352 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4356 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4364 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4366 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4369 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4371 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4374 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4378 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4379 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4381 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4384 *secid = peer_secid;
4385 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4390 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4392 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
4395 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4397 sk_free_security(sk);
4400 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4402 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
4403 struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
4405 newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
4406 newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4407 newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
4409 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec, newsk->sk_family);
4412 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4415 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4417 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4419 *secid = sksec->sid;
4423 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4425 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4426 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4428 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4429 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4430 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4431 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4434 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4435 struct request_sock *req)
4437 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4439 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4443 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4444 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4447 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4450 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4451 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4452 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4456 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4460 req->secid = newsid;
4461 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4465 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4466 const struct request_sock *req)
4468 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4470 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4471 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4472 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4473 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4474 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4475 time it will have been created and available. */
4477 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4478 * thread with access to newsksec */
4479 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
4482 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4484 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4485 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4487 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4488 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4491 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4493 selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_established(sk, family);
4496 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4499 fl->secid = req->secid;
4502 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4506 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4507 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
4508 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4510 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4514 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4516 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4518 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4519 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4520 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4521 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4522 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
4523 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4533 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
4538 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4540 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4546 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4551 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4554 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4555 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4556 peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4557 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4560 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4563 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4564 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4565 ad.u.net.family = family;
4566 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4569 if (peerlbl_active) {
4570 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4573 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4579 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4580 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4584 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4585 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4586 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4588 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4594 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4595 struct sk_buff *skb,
4596 const struct net_device *in,
4597 const struct net_device *out,
4598 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4600 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4603 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4604 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4605 struct sk_buff *skb,
4606 const struct net_device *in,
4607 const struct net_device *out,
4608 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4610 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4614 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4619 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4622 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4623 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4624 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4626 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4629 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4630 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4636 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4637 struct sk_buff *skb,
4638 const struct net_device *in,
4639 const struct net_device *out,
4640 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4642 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4645 static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4647 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4648 u16 family, char *addrp)
4651 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4653 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, send_perm;
4654 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4656 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4657 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4660 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4661 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
4662 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
4663 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4665 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4666 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
4667 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
4668 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4670 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4671 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
4672 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
4673 send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4676 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
4677 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
4682 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4685 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4688 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4691 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4698 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4699 ntohs(ad->u.net.dport), &port_sid);
4700 if (unlikely(err)) {
4702 "SELinux: failure in"
4703 " selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(),"
4704 " network port label not found\n");
4707 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, send_perm, ad);
4710 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4714 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4715 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4716 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4722 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4724 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4725 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4726 ad.u.net.family = family;
4727 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4730 if (selinux_compat_net) {
4731 if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex,
4732 &ad, family, addrp))
4734 } else if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4735 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4736 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4740 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4741 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4747 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4753 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4758 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4759 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4760 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4761 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4762 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4763 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4765 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4766 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4767 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4768 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4769 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4770 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4771 if (skb->dst != NULL && skb->dst->xfrm != NULL)
4774 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4775 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4776 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4779 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4780 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4781 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4782 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4787 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED)
4788 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4790 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4793 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED)
4794 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4796 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4801 if (secmark_perm == PACKET__FORWARD_OUT) {
4802 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4805 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4807 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4808 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4809 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4812 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4813 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4814 ad.u.net.family = family;
4815 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4819 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4820 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4823 if (peerlbl_active) {
4827 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4829 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4830 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4833 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4835 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4836 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4843 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4844 struct sk_buff *skb,
4845 const struct net_device *in,
4846 const struct net_device *out,
4847 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4849 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4852 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4853 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4854 struct sk_buff *skb,
4855 const struct net_device *in,
4856 const struct net_device *out,
4857 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4859 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4863 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4865 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4869 err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
4873 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
4874 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4879 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4882 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4884 err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4888 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4889 ad.u.cap = capability;
4891 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4892 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4895 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4896 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4899 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4902 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4906 sid = task_sid(task);
4907 isec->sclass = sclass;
4909 perm->security = isec;
4914 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4916 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4917 perm->security = NULL;
4921 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4923 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4925 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4929 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4930 msg->security = msec;
4935 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4937 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4939 msg->security = NULL;
4943 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4946 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4947 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4948 u32 sid = current_sid();
4950 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4952 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4953 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4955 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4958 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4960 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4963 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4965 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4968 /* message queue security operations */
4969 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4971 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4972 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4973 u32 sid = current_sid();
4976 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4980 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4982 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4983 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4985 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4988 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4994 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4996 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4999 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
5001 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5002 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5003 u32 sid = current_sid();
5005 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5007 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5008 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5010 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5011 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5014 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
5022 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5023 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5026 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
5029 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
5032 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
5038 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
5042 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
5044 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5045 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5046 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5047 u32 sid = current_sid();
5050 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5051 msec = msg->security;
5054 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
5056 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
5058 * Compute new sid based on current process and
5059 * message queue this message will be stored in
5061 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5067 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5068 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5070 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
5071 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5074 /* Can this process send the message */
5075 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5078 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
5079 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5080 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
5085 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
5086 struct task_struct *target,
5087 long type, int mode)
5089 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5090 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5091 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5092 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
5095 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5096 msec = msg->security;
5098 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5099 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5101 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
5102 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
5104 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
5105 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
5109 /* Shared Memory security operations */
5110 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5112 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5113 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5114 u32 sid = current_sid();
5117 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
5121 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5123 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5124 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5126 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5129 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5135 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5137 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5140 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5142 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5143 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5144 u32 sid = current_sid();
5146 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5148 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5149 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5151 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5152 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5155 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5156 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5164 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5165 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5168 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5171 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5178 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5184 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5188 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5189 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5194 rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
5198 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5201 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5203 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5206 /* Semaphore security operations */
5207 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5209 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5210 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5211 u32 sid = current_sid();
5214 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5218 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5220 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5221 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5223 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5226 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5232 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5234 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5237 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5239 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5240 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5241 u32 sid = current_sid();
5243 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5245 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5246 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5248 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5249 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5252 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5253 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5261 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5262 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5266 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5277 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5280 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5284 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5290 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5294 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5295 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5300 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5304 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5307 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5313 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5315 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5320 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5323 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5325 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5329 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5332 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5335 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5336 char *name, char **value)
5338 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5344 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5350 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5352 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5354 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5356 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5357 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5358 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5359 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5360 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5361 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5362 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5363 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5371 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5381 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5382 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5384 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5385 struct task_struct *tracer;
5392 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5393 security attributes. */
5398 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5399 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5400 * above restriction is ever removed.
5402 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5403 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5404 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5405 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5406 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5407 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5408 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5409 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5410 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5411 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5417 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5418 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5419 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5423 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5424 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5425 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5427 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5434 new = prepare_creds();
5438 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5439 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5440 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5441 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5442 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5443 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5444 tsec = new->security;
5445 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5446 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5447 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5448 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5449 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5450 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5453 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5454 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5455 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5456 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5461 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5463 if (!is_single_threaded(p)) {
5464 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5469 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5470 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5471 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5475 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5476 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5479 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
5481 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5485 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5486 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5505 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5507 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5510 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5512 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5515 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5522 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5523 unsigned long flags)
5525 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5526 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5528 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5532 tsec = cred->security;
5533 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5534 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5536 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5542 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5544 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5550 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5551 const struct cred *cred,
5555 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5558 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5559 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5560 appear to be created. */
5564 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5566 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5567 ksec = key->security;
5569 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5572 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5574 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5575 char *context = NULL;
5579 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5588 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5591 .ptrace_may_access = selinux_ptrace_may_access,
5592 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5593 .capget = selinux_capget,
5594 .capset = selinux_capset,
5595 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
5596 .capable = selinux_capable,
5597 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5598 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5599 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5600 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5602 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5603 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5605 .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5606 .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5607 .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5608 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5610 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5611 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5612 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5613 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5614 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5615 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5616 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5617 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5618 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5619 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5620 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5623 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5624 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5625 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5626 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5627 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5628 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5629 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5630 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5631 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5632 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5633 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5634 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5635 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5636 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5637 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5638 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5639 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5640 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5641 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5642 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5643 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5644 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5645 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5646 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5647 .inode_need_killpriv = selinux_inode_need_killpriv,
5648 .inode_killpriv = selinux_inode_killpriv,
5649 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5651 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5652 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5653 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5654 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5655 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5656 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5657 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5658 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5659 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5660 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5661 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5663 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5665 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5666 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5667 .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
5668 .cred_commit = selinux_cred_commit,
5669 .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
5670 .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5671 .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
5672 .task_fix_setuid = selinux_task_fix_setuid,
5673 .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
5674 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5675 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5676 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5677 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5678 .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
5679 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5680 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5681 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5682 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5683 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5684 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5685 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5686 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5687 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5688 .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
5689 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5691 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5692 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5694 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5695 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5697 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5698 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5699 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5700 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5701 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5702 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5704 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5705 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5706 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5707 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5708 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5710 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5711 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5712 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5713 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5714 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5716 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5718 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5719 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5721 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5722 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5723 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5725 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5726 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5728 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5729 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5730 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5731 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5732 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5733 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5734 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5735 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5736 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5737 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5738 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5739 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5740 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5741 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5742 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5743 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5744 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5745 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5746 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5747 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5748 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5749 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5750 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5751 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5752 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5754 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5755 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5756 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5757 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5758 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5759 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5760 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5761 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5762 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5763 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5764 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5768 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5769 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5770 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5771 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5775 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5776 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5777 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5778 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5782 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5784 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5785 selinux_enabled = 0;
5789 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5790 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5794 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5796 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5797 cred_init_security();
5799 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5800 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5801 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5804 secondary_ops = security_ops;
5806 panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5807 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5808 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5810 if (selinux_enforcing)
5811 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5813 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5818 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5820 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5822 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5823 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5824 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5825 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5827 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
5828 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
5829 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
5830 struct superblock_security_struct,
5832 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
5834 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5835 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5836 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
5838 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5840 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5841 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5842 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
5845 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5846 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5849 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5850 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5851 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5853 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5855 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5857 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5858 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5860 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5861 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5864 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5865 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5867 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5868 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5871 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
5872 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5874 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5875 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5879 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5881 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5883 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5884 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5886 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5887 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5890 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5891 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5893 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5894 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5900 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5904 if (!selinux_enabled)
5907 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5909 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5911 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5913 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5914 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5916 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5923 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5925 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5926 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5928 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5930 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5931 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5932 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5937 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5939 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5940 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5943 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5945 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5946 static int selinux_disabled;
5948 int selinux_disable(void)
5950 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5952 if (ss_initialized) {
5953 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5957 if (selinux_disabled) {
5958 /* Only do this once. */
5962 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5964 selinux_disabled = 1;
5965 selinux_enabled = 0;
5967 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5968 security_ops = secondary_ops;
5970 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5971 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5973 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */