2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel.h>
28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
29 #include <linux/errno.h>
30 #include <linux/sched.h>
31 #include <linux/security.h>
32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
33 #include <linux/capability.h>
34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
36 #include <linux/mman.h>
37 #include <linux/slab.h>
38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
39 #include <linux/swap.h>
40 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
41 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
42 #include <linux/file.h>
43 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
44 #include <linux/namei.h>
45 #include <linux/mount.h>
46 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
54 #include <net/netlabel.h>
55 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
56 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
57 #include <asm/atomic.h>
58 #include <linux/bitops.h>
59 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
60 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/tcp.h>
63 #include <linux/udp.h>
64 #include <linux/dccp.h>
65 #include <linux/quota.h>
66 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
67 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
68 #include <linux/parser.h>
69 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
71 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
72 #include <linux/personality.h>
73 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
74 #include <linux/audit.h>
75 #include <linux/string.h>
76 #include <linux/selinux.h>
77 #include <linux/mutex.h>
78 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
89 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
90 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
92 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
94 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
95 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
96 extern int selinux_compat_net;
97 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
99 /* SECMARK reference count */
100 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
102 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
103 int selinux_enforcing;
105 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
107 unsigned long enforcing;
108 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
109 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
112 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
115 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
116 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
118 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
120 unsigned long enabled;
121 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
122 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
125 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
127 int selinux_enabled = 1;
132 * Minimal support for a secondary security module,
133 * just to allow the use of the capability module.
135 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
137 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
138 before the policy was loaded. */
139 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
140 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
142 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
145 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
148 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
149 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
150 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
151 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
154 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
156 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
160 * initialise the security for the init task
162 static void cred_init_security(void)
164 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
165 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
167 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
169 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
171 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
172 cred->security = tsec;
176 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
178 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
180 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
182 tsec = cred->security;
187 * get the objective security ID of a task
189 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
194 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
200 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
202 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
204 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_cred()->security;
209 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
211 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
213 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
214 u32 sid = current_sid();
216 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
220 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
221 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
223 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
224 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
225 isec->task_sid = sid;
226 inode->i_security = isec;
231 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
233 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
234 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
236 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
237 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
238 list_del_init(&isec->list);
239 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
241 inode->i_security = NULL;
242 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
245 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
247 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
248 u32 sid = current_sid();
250 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
255 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
256 file->f_security = fsec;
261 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
263 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
264 file->f_security = NULL;
268 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
270 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
272 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
276 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
277 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
278 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
279 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
281 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
282 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
283 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
284 sb->s_security = sbsec;
289 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
291 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
293 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
294 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
295 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
296 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
298 sb->s_security = NULL;
302 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
304 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
306 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
310 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
311 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
312 sk->sk_security = ssec;
314 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec, family);
319 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
321 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
323 sk->sk_security = NULL;
324 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssec);
328 /* The security server must be initialized before
329 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
330 extern int ss_initialized;
332 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
334 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
336 "uses transition SIDs",
338 "uses genfs_contexts",
339 "not configured for labeling",
340 "uses mountpoint labeling",
343 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
345 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
347 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
356 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
359 static const match_table_t tokens = {
360 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
361 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
362 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
363 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
364 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
368 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
370 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
371 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
372 const struct cred *cred)
374 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
377 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
378 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
382 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
383 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
387 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
388 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
389 const struct cred *cred)
391 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
393 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
394 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
398 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
399 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
403 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
405 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
406 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
407 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
410 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
411 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
412 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
413 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
414 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
415 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
416 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
417 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
418 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
422 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
423 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
424 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
425 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
426 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
427 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
429 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
430 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
431 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
436 sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
438 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
439 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
440 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
442 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
443 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
444 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
446 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS ||
447 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
448 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
449 sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
450 sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
452 /* Initialize the root inode. */
453 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
455 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
456 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
457 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
459 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
461 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
462 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
463 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
464 struct inode_security_struct, list);
465 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
466 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
467 inode = igrab(inode);
469 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
473 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
474 list_del_init(&isec->list);
477 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
483 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
484 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
485 * mount options, or whatever.
487 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
488 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
491 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
492 char *context = NULL;
496 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
498 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
504 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
505 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
506 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
508 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
511 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
512 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
513 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
515 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
516 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
521 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
522 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
528 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
529 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
532 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
533 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
535 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
536 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
539 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
540 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
542 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
543 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
546 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
547 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
549 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
550 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
551 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
553 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
556 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
557 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
559 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) {
560 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
561 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP;
564 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
569 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
573 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
574 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
576 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
578 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
579 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
580 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
581 (old_sid != new_sid))
584 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
585 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
587 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
588 if (mnt_flags & flag)
594 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
595 * labeling information.
597 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
598 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
600 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
602 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
603 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
604 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
605 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
606 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
607 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
608 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
609 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
610 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
612 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
614 if (!ss_initialized) {
616 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
617 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
618 server is ready to handle calls. */
619 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
620 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
621 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
622 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
626 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
627 "before the security server is initialized\n");
632 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
633 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
634 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
635 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
637 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
638 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
639 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
640 * will be used for both mounts)
642 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
647 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
648 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
649 * than once with different security options.
651 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
654 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
656 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
657 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
659 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
660 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
661 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
668 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
670 goto out_double_mount;
672 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
677 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
679 goto out_double_mount;
681 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
683 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
684 rootcontext_sid = sid;
686 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
688 goto out_double_mount;
690 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
694 defcontext_sid = sid;
696 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
698 goto out_double_mount;
700 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
709 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
710 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
711 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
712 goto out_double_mount;
717 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
718 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
720 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
721 rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
723 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
724 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
728 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
730 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
734 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
738 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
739 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
740 * the superblock context if not already set.
743 if (!fscontext_sid) {
744 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
748 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
750 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
755 if (!rootcontext_sid)
756 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
758 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
759 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
762 if (rootcontext_sid) {
763 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
768 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
769 root_isec->initialized = 1;
772 if (defcontext_sid) {
773 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
775 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
776 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
780 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
781 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
787 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
790 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
792 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
796 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
797 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
801 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
802 struct super_block *newsb)
804 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
805 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
807 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
808 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
809 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
812 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
813 * mount options. thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
816 if (!ss_initialized) {
817 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
818 if (list_empty(&newsbsec->list))
819 list_add(&newsbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
820 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
824 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
825 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
827 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
828 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
831 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
833 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
835 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
836 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
837 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
840 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
844 if (!set_rootcontext) {
845 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
846 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
849 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
851 if (set_rootcontext) {
852 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
853 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
854 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
855 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
857 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
860 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
861 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
864 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
865 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
868 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
869 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
870 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
872 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
874 /* Standard string-based options. */
875 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
877 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
882 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
886 if (context || defcontext) {
888 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
891 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
901 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
904 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
911 case Opt_rootcontext:
914 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
917 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
925 if (context || defcontext) {
927 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
930 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
936 case Opt_labelsupport:
940 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
947 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
951 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
952 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
953 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
958 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
959 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
962 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
963 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
966 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
967 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
970 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
971 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
974 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
985 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
987 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
990 char *options = data;
991 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
993 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
998 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
1000 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
1005 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1008 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1012 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
1013 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
1018 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
1021 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
1022 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
1026 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
1028 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
1031 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
1033 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
1034 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
1036 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
1037 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
1039 case SE_SBLABELSUPP:
1041 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
1046 /* we need a comma before each option */
1048 seq_puts(m, prefix);
1051 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1057 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1059 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1062 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1064 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1070 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1072 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1077 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1079 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1081 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1083 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1085 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1087 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1089 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1091 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1093 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1097 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1100 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1102 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1105 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1107 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1110 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1116 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1117 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1119 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1126 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1127 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1129 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1131 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1132 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1134 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1136 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1138 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1144 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1145 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1146 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1147 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1148 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1150 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1152 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1153 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1154 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1156 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1157 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1158 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1159 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1160 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1161 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1162 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1164 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1167 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1169 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1171 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1174 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1177 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1178 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1183 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1185 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1190 end = buffer+buflen;
1195 while (de && de != de->parent) {
1196 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1200 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1205 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1206 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1210 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1218 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1219 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1221 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1222 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1224 struct dentry *dentry;
1225 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1226 char *context = NULL;
1230 if (isec->initialized)
1233 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1234 if (isec->initialized)
1237 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1238 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1239 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1240 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1241 server is ready to handle calls. */
1242 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1243 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1244 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1245 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1249 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1250 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1251 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1252 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1256 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1257 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1259 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1260 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1262 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1263 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1266 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: no dentry for dev=%s "
1267 "ino=%ld\n", __func__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
1272 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1273 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1279 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1281 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1282 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1283 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1291 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1297 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1303 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1304 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1305 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1306 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1310 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1311 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1314 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1318 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1319 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1320 __func__, context, -rc,
1321 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1323 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1331 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1332 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1334 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1335 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1336 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1338 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1339 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1340 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1348 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1349 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1352 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1353 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1355 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1356 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1358 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1359 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1370 isec->initialized = 1;
1373 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1375 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1376 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1380 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1381 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1387 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1388 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1391 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1392 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1395 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1396 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1399 /* All other signals. */
1400 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1408 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1409 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1411 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1412 const struct cred *target,
1415 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1417 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1421 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1422 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1423 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1424 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1426 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1427 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1430 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1434 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1435 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1437 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1441 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1442 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1443 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1444 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1446 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1451 sid = current_sid();
1452 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1453 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1456 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1457 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1460 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1461 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1462 const struct cred *cred,
1465 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1466 struct av_decision avd;
1468 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1469 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1472 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1476 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1478 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1481 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1485 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1489 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1490 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT)
1491 avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1495 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1496 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1499 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1501 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1502 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1505 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1506 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1507 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1508 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1509 struct inode *inode,
1511 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1513 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1514 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1517 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1520 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1521 isec = inode->i_security;
1525 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1526 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1529 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1532 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1533 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1534 pathname if needed. */
1535 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1536 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1537 struct dentry *dentry,
1540 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1541 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1543 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1544 ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1545 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1546 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1549 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1550 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1551 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1552 check a particular permission to the file.
1553 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1554 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1555 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1556 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1557 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1561 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1562 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1563 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1564 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1567 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1568 ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1570 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1571 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1579 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1582 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1588 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1589 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1590 struct dentry *dentry,
1593 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1594 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
1595 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1596 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1598 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1601 dsec = dir->i_security;
1602 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1605 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1607 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1608 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1610 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1611 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1616 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
1617 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, &newsid);
1622 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1626 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1627 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1628 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1631 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1632 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1633 struct task_struct *ctx)
1635 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1637 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1641 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1644 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1645 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1646 struct dentry *dentry,
1650 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1651 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1652 u32 sid = current_sid();
1656 dsec = dir->i_security;
1657 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1659 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1660 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1663 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1664 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1679 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1684 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1688 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1689 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1690 struct inode *new_dir,
1691 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1693 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1694 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1695 u32 sid = current_sid();
1697 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1700 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1701 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1702 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1703 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1705 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1707 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1708 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1709 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1712 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1713 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1716 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1717 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1718 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1723 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1724 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1725 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1726 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1727 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1730 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1731 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1732 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1733 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1735 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1743 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1744 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1745 struct super_block *sb,
1747 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1749 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1750 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1752 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1753 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1756 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1757 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1761 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1762 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1763 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1764 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1767 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1769 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1773 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1775 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1777 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1784 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1785 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1789 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1791 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1792 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1799 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1808 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1811 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1813 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1815 if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
1816 mode_t mode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode;
1818 * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1822 else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
1823 av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
1824 else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
1825 av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
1826 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
1827 av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
1828 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
1831 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1832 "unknown mode:%o\n", __func__, mode);
1837 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1839 static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
1844 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
1848 if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1849 u32 sid = current_sid();
1850 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1851 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1854 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1857 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1861 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_traceme(parent);
1865 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1868 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1869 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1873 error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1877 return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1880 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1881 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1882 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1883 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1887 error = secondary_ops->capset(new, old,
1888 effective, inheritable, permitted);
1892 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1895 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
1900 rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1904 return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1907 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1910 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1913 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1918 end = buffer+buflen;
1924 const char *name = table->procname;
1925 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1926 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1930 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1933 table = table->parent;
1939 memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1941 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1943 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1948 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1955 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1959 sid = current_sid();
1961 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1962 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1964 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1965 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1968 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1969 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1971 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
1972 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1980 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
1981 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1987 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1989 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2001 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2006 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2009 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2015 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2017 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2019 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2022 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2026 rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
2031 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
2032 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2033 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
2035 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
2036 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
2037 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2038 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
2040 case 0: /* Close log */
2041 case 1: /* Open log */
2042 case 2: /* Read from log */
2043 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
2044 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
2046 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
2053 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2054 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2055 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2057 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
2058 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
2059 * the capability is granted.
2061 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2062 * processes that allocate mappings.
2064 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2066 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2068 rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2069 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2073 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
2076 /* binprm security operations */
2078 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2080 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2081 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2082 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2083 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2084 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2087 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_creds(bprm);
2091 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2092 * the script interpreter */
2093 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
2096 old_tsec = current_security();
2097 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2098 isec = inode->i_security;
2100 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2101 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2102 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2104 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2105 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2106 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2107 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2109 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2110 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2111 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2112 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2114 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2115 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2116 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &new_tsec->sid);
2121 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2122 ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2124 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2125 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2127 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2128 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2129 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2133 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2134 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2135 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2139 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2140 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2144 /* Check for shared state */
2145 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2146 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2147 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2153 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2154 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2156 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2157 struct task_struct *tracer;
2158 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2162 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
2163 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2164 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2170 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2172 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2178 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2179 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2185 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2187 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2188 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2196 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2197 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2198 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2199 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2201 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2204 return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2207 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2208 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2210 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2211 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2212 struct files_struct *files)
2214 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2215 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2216 struct tty_struct *tty;
2217 struct fdtable *fdt;
2221 tty = get_current_tty();
2224 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2225 struct inode *inode;
2227 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2228 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2229 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2230 file may belong to another process and we are only
2231 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2232 file = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct file, f_u.fu_list);
2233 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2234 if (inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2235 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2242 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2246 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2248 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2250 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2252 unsigned long set, i;
2257 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2258 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2260 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2263 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2264 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2269 if (file_has_perm(cred,
2271 file_to_av(file))) {
2273 fd = get_unused_fd();
2283 devnull = dentry_open(
2285 mntget(selinuxfs_mount),
2287 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2294 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2299 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2302 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2306 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2308 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2310 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2311 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2314 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2315 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2318 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2319 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2321 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2322 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2324 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2325 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2326 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2328 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2329 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2330 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2331 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2332 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2334 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2335 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2337 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2338 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2339 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2340 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2342 update_rlimit_cpu(rlim->rlim_cur);
2347 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2350 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2352 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2353 struct itimerval itimer;
2354 struct sighand_struct *psig;
2357 unsigned long flags;
2365 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2366 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2367 * flush and unblock signals.
2369 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2370 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2372 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2374 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2375 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2376 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2377 flush_signals(current);
2378 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2379 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2380 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2381 recalc_sigpending();
2382 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2385 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2386 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2387 read_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2388 psig = current->parent->sighand;
2389 spin_lock_irqsave(&psig->siglock, flags);
2390 wake_up_interruptible(¤t->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
2391 spin_unlock_irqrestore(&psig->siglock, flags);
2392 read_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2395 /* superblock security operations */
2397 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2399 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2402 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2404 superblock_free_security(sb);
2407 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2412 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2415 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2417 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2418 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2419 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2420 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2421 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2424 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2431 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2435 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2438 int current_size = 0;
2446 while (current_size < len) {
2456 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2458 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2459 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2460 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2466 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2474 in_save = in_end = orig;
2478 open_quote = !open_quote;
2479 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2481 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2483 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2484 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2486 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2488 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2490 } while (*in_end++);
2492 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2493 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2498 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2500 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2501 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2504 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2508 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2509 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2512 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2513 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2514 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2517 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2519 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2520 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2522 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2523 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2524 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2527 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2530 unsigned long flags,
2533 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2535 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2536 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2537 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2539 return dentry_has_perm(cred, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2543 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2545 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2547 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2548 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2551 /* inode security operations */
2553 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2555 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2558 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2560 inode_free_security(inode);
2563 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2564 char **name, void **value,
2567 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2568 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2569 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2570 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2571 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2573 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2575 dsec = dir->i_security;
2576 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2579 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2581 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
2582 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2583 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2586 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2587 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2590 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2595 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2596 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2597 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2598 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2600 isec->initialized = 1;
2603 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2607 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2614 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2626 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2628 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2631 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2633 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2636 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2638 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2641 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2643 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2646 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2648 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2651 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2653 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2656 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2658 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2661 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2662 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2664 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2667 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2669 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2671 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2674 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2676 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2679 rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, nameidata);
2682 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2685 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2687 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2690 rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask);
2695 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2699 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2700 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2703 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2705 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2708 rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2712 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2715 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2716 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2717 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2719 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2722 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2724 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2726 return dentry_has_perm(cred, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2729 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2731 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2733 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2734 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2735 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2736 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2738 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2739 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2740 Restrict to administrator. */
2745 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2746 ordinary setattr permission. */
2747 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2750 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2751 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2753 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2754 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2755 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2756 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2757 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2760 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2761 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2763 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2764 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2767 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2770 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2771 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2773 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2774 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2778 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2779 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2780 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2782 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2787 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2788 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2792 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
2797 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2799 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2800 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2804 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2805 const void *value, size_t size,
2808 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2809 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2813 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2814 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2818 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2820 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2821 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2822 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2830 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2832 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2834 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2837 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2839 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2841 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2844 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2846 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2847 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2849 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2850 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2855 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2857 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2859 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2863 char *context = NULL;
2864 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2866 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2870 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2871 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2872 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2873 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2874 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2875 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2876 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2878 error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
2879 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2881 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2884 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2897 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2898 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2900 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2904 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2907 if (!value || !size)
2910 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2918 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2920 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2921 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2922 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2926 static int selinux_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2928 return secondary_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
2931 static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2933 return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
2936 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2938 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2942 /* file security operations */
2944 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2946 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2948 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2951 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2955 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2956 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2959 rc = file_has_perm(cred, file,
2960 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2964 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2967 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2969 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2970 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2971 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2972 u32 sid = current_sid();
2975 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2979 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid
2980 && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2981 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2983 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2986 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2988 return file_alloc_security(file);
2991 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2993 file_free_security(file);
2996 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2999 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3002 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
3004 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
3009 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3012 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3014 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3017 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3018 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3020 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3021 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3022 * This has an additional check.
3024 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3031 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3032 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3034 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3035 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3038 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3039 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3041 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3048 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3049 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
3050 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
3053 u32 sid = current_sid();
3055 if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
3056 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3057 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3058 if (rc || addr_only)
3061 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3064 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3065 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3068 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3069 unsigned long reqprot,
3072 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3075 rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
3079 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3082 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3083 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3085 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3086 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3087 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3088 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3089 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3090 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3091 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3092 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3094 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3095 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3096 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3097 * modified content. This typically should only
3098 * occur for text relocations.
3100 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3107 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3110 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3112 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3114 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3117 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3120 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3125 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3130 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3131 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3140 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3141 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3146 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3151 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3155 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3162 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3164 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3166 fsec = file->f_security;
3167 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3172 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3173 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3176 u32 sid = current_sid();
3178 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3180 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3181 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3183 fsec = file->f_security;
3186 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3188 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3190 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3191 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3194 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3196 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3198 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3201 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3203 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3204 struct inode *inode;
3205 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3207 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3208 fsec = file->f_security;
3209 isec = inode->i_security;
3211 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3212 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3213 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3214 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3215 * struct as its SID.
3217 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3218 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3220 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3221 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3222 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3223 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3224 * new inode label or new policy.
3225 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3227 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL);
3230 /* task security operations */
3232 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3236 rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
3240 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3244 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3246 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3248 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3249 cred->security = NULL;
3254 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3256 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3259 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3260 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3262 old_tsec = old->security;
3264 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3268 new->security = tsec;
3273 * commit new credentials
3275 static void selinux_cred_commit(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3277 secondary_ops->cred_commit(new, old);
3281 * set the security data for a kernel service
3282 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3284 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3286 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3287 u32 sid = current_sid();
3290 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3291 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3292 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3296 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3297 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3298 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3304 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3305 * objective context of the specified inode
3307 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3309 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3310 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3311 u32 sid = current_sid();
3314 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3315 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3316 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3320 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3324 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3326 /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
3327 since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
3328 identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
3329 this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
3330 of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
3335 static int selinux_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3338 return secondary_ops->task_fix_setuid(new, old, flags);
3341 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
3343 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3347 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3349 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3352 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3354 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3357 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3359 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3362 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3364 *secid = task_sid(p);
3367 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
3369 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3373 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3377 rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
3381 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3384 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3388 rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3392 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3395 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3397 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3400 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3402 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
3405 rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
3409 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3410 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3411 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3412 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3413 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3414 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3419 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
3423 rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
3427 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3430 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3432 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3435 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3437 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3440 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3446 rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
3451 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3453 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3455 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3456 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3458 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3462 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
3468 /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
3469 any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
3470 the state of the current process. */
3471 return secondary_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
3474 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3476 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3479 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3480 struct inode *inode)
3482 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3483 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3486 isec->initialized = 1;
3489 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3490 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3491 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3493 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3494 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3496 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3497 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3501 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3502 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3505 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3506 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3510 *proto = ih->protocol;
3512 switch (ih->protocol) {
3514 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3516 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3520 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3524 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3525 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3530 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3532 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3536 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3540 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3541 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3545 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3546 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3548 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3552 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3556 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3557 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3568 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3570 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3571 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3572 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3575 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3576 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3578 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3579 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3583 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3584 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3587 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3588 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3589 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3598 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3600 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3604 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3605 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3610 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3612 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3616 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3617 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3621 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3622 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3624 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3628 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3629 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3633 /* includes fragments */
3643 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3644 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3649 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3651 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3654 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3655 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3658 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3660 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3663 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3664 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3674 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3675 " unable to parse packet\n");
3685 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3687 * @family: protocol family
3688 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3691 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3692 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3693 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3694 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3695 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3699 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3706 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3707 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3709 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3710 if (unlikely(err)) {
3712 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3713 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3720 /* socket security operations */
3721 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3724 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3725 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3729 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3731 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3733 sid = task_sid(task);
3735 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3736 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3737 err = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3743 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3744 int protocol, int kern)
3746 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3747 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3756 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ?: sid;
3758 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3759 err = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3765 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3766 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3768 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3769 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3770 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3771 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3776 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
3778 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3781 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3787 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3788 isec->initialized = 1;
3791 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3792 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3793 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3794 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
3800 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3801 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3802 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3804 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3809 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3814 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3815 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3816 * check the first address now.
3818 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3819 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3821 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3822 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3823 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3824 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3825 unsigned short snum;
3826 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3829 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3831 if (family == PF_INET) {
3832 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3833 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3834 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3836 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3837 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3838 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3844 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3846 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3847 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3851 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3852 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3853 ad.u.net.family = family;
3854 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3856 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3862 switch (isec->sclass) {
3863 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3864 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3867 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3868 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3871 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3872 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3876 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3880 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3884 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3885 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3886 ad.u.net.family = family;
3888 if (family == PF_INET)
3889 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3891 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3893 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3894 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3902 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3904 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3905 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3908 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3913 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3915 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3916 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3917 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3918 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3919 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3920 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3921 unsigned short snum;
3924 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3925 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3926 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3928 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3930 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3931 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3933 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3936 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3940 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3941 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3943 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3944 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3945 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3946 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3951 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3957 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3959 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3962 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3965 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3966 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3968 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3972 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3974 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3975 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3976 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3977 newisec->initialized = 1;
3982 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3987 rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3991 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
3994 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3995 int size, int flags)
3997 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
4000 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
4002 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4005 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
4007 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4010 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4014 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4018 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4021 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4024 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4027 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4029 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4032 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
4033 struct socket *other,
4036 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4037 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4038 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
4039 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4042 err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
4046 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4047 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
4049 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4050 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
4052 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
4054 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4058 /* connecting socket */
4059 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4060 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
4062 /* server child socket */
4063 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
4064 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
4065 err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
4070 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4071 struct socket *other)
4073 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4074 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
4075 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4078 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4079 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
4081 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4082 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
4084 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
4085 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
4092 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
4094 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
4100 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4103 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4104 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4108 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4111 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4112 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4115 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4116 struct sk_buff *skb,
4117 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4122 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4124 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, recv_perm;
4125 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4127 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4128 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4131 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4132 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
4133 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
4134 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4136 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4137 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
4138 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
4139 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4141 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4142 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
4143 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
4144 recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4147 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
4148 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
4153 err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
4156 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4160 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4163 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4169 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4170 ntohs(ad->u.net.sport), &port_sid);
4171 if (unlikely(err)) {
4173 "SELinux: failure in"
4174 " selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(),"
4175 " network port label not found\n");
4178 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, recv_perm, ad);
4181 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4185 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4187 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4188 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4191 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4192 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4193 ad.u.net.family = family;
4194 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4198 if (selinux_compat_net)
4199 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
4201 else if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4202 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4207 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4208 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4211 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4212 SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad);
4214 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4216 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4219 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4225 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4228 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4229 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4230 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4231 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4236 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4239 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4240 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4243 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4244 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4245 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4246 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4247 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4248 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4250 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4251 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4252 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4255 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4256 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4257 ad.u.net.family = family;
4258 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4262 if (peerlbl_active) {
4265 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4268 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family,
4271 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4274 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4277 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4280 if (secmark_active) {
4281 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4290 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4291 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4296 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4297 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4298 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4300 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4302 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4303 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
4304 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4305 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4307 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4312 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4317 if (scontext_len > len) {
4322 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4326 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4334 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4336 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4339 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4341 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4344 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4348 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4349 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4351 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4354 *secid = peer_secid;
4355 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4360 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4362 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
4365 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4367 sk_free_security(sk);
4370 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4372 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
4373 struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
4375 newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
4376 newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4377 newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
4379 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec, newsk->sk_family);
4382 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4385 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4387 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4389 *secid = sksec->sid;
4393 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4395 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4396 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4398 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4399 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4400 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4401 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4404 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4405 struct request_sock *req)
4407 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4409 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4413 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4414 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4417 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4420 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4421 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4422 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4426 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4430 req->secid = newsid;
4431 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4435 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4436 const struct request_sock *req)
4438 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4440 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4441 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4442 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4443 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4444 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4445 time it will have been created and available. */
4447 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4448 * thread with access to newsksec */
4449 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
4452 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4454 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4455 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4457 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4458 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4461 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4463 selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_established(sk, family);
4466 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4469 fl->secid = req->secid;
4472 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4476 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4477 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
4478 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4480 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4484 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4486 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4488 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4489 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4490 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4491 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4492 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
4493 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4503 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
4508 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4510 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4516 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4521 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4524 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4525 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4526 peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4527 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4530 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4533 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4534 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4535 ad.u.net.family = family;
4536 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4539 if (peerlbl_active) {
4540 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4543 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4549 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4550 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4554 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4555 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4556 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4558 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4564 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4565 struct sk_buff *skb,
4566 const struct net_device *in,
4567 const struct net_device *out,
4568 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4570 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4573 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4574 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4575 struct sk_buff *skb,
4576 const struct net_device *in,
4577 const struct net_device *out,
4578 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4580 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4584 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4589 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4592 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4593 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4594 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4596 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4599 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4600 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4606 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4607 struct sk_buff *skb,
4608 const struct net_device *in,
4609 const struct net_device *out,
4610 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4612 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4615 static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4617 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4618 u16 family, char *addrp)
4621 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4623 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, send_perm;
4624 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4626 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4627 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4630 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4631 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
4632 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
4633 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4635 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4636 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
4637 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
4638 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4640 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4641 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
4642 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
4643 send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4646 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
4647 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
4652 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4655 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4658 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4661 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4668 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4669 ntohs(ad->u.net.dport), &port_sid);
4670 if (unlikely(err)) {
4672 "SELinux: failure in"
4673 " selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(),"
4674 " network port label not found\n");
4677 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, send_perm, ad);
4680 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4684 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4685 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4686 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4692 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4694 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4695 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4696 ad.u.net.family = family;
4697 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4700 if (selinux_compat_net) {
4701 if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex,
4702 &ad, family, addrp))
4704 } else if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4705 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4706 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4710 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4711 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4717 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4723 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4728 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4729 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4730 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4731 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4732 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4733 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4735 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4736 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4737 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4738 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4739 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4740 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4741 if (skb->dst != NULL && skb->dst->xfrm != NULL)
4744 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4745 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4746 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4749 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4750 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4751 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4752 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4757 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED)
4758 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4760 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4763 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED)
4764 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4766 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4771 if (secmark_perm == PACKET__FORWARD_OUT) {
4772 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4775 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4777 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4778 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4779 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4782 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4783 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4784 ad.u.net.family = family;
4785 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4789 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4790 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4793 if (peerlbl_active) {
4797 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4799 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4800 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4803 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4805 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4806 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4813 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4814 struct sk_buff *skb,
4815 const struct net_device *in,
4816 const struct net_device *out,
4817 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4819 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4822 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4823 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4824 struct sk_buff *skb,
4825 const struct net_device *in,
4826 const struct net_device *out,
4827 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4829 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4833 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4835 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4839 err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
4843 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
4844 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4849 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4852 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4854 err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4858 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4859 ad.u.cap = capability;
4861 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4862 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4865 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4866 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4869 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4872 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4876 sid = task_sid(task);
4877 isec->sclass = sclass;
4879 perm->security = isec;
4884 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4886 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4887 perm->security = NULL;
4891 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4893 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4895 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4899 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4900 msg->security = msec;
4905 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4907 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4909 msg->security = NULL;
4913 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4916 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4917 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4918 u32 sid = current_sid();
4920 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4922 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4923 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4925 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4928 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4930 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4933 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4935 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4938 /* message queue security operations */
4939 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4941 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4942 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4943 u32 sid = current_sid();
4946 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4950 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4952 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4953 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4955 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4958 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4964 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4966 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4969 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4971 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4972 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4973 u32 sid = current_sid();
4975 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4977 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4978 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4980 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4981 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4984 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4992 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4993 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4996 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4999 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
5002 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
5008 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
5012 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
5014 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5015 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5016 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5017 u32 sid = current_sid();
5020 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5021 msec = msg->security;
5024 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
5026 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
5028 * Compute new sid based on current process and
5029 * message queue this message will be stored in
5031 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5037 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5038 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5040 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
5041 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5044 /* Can this process send the message */
5045 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5048 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
5049 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5050 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
5055 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
5056 struct task_struct *target,
5057 long type, int mode)
5059 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5060 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5061 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5062 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
5065 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5066 msec = msg->security;
5068 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5069 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5071 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
5072 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
5074 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
5075 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
5079 /* Shared Memory security operations */
5080 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5082 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5083 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5084 u32 sid = current_sid();
5087 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
5091 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5093 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5094 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5096 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5099 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5105 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5107 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5110 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5112 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5113 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5114 u32 sid = current_sid();
5116 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5118 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5119 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5121 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5122 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5125 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5126 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5134 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5135 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5138 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5141 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5148 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5154 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5158 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5159 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5164 rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
5168 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5171 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5173 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5176 /* Semaphore security operations */
5177 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5179 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5180 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5181 u32 sid = current_sid();
5184 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5188 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5190 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5191 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5193 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5196 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5202 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5204 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5207 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5209 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5210 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5211 u32 sid = current_sid();
5213 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5215 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5216 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5218 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5219 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5222 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5223 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5231 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5232 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5236 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5247 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5250 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5254 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5260 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5264 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5265 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5270 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5274 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5277 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5283 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5285 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5290 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5293 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5295 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5299 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5302 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5305 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5306 char *name, char **value)
5308 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5314 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5320 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5322 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5324 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5326 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5327 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5328 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5329 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5330 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5331 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5332 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5333 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5341 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5351 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5352 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5354 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5355 struct task_struct *tracer;
5362 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5363 security attributes. */
5368 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5369 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5370 * above restriction is ever removed.
5372 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5373 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5374 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5375 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5376 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5377 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5378 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5379 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5380 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5381 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5387 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5388 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5389 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5393 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5394 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5395 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5397 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5404 new = prepare_creds();
5408 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5409 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5410 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5411 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5412 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5413 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5414 tsec = new->security;
5415 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5416 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5417 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5418 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5419 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5420 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5423 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5424 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5425 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5426 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5431 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5433 if (!is_single_threaded(p)) {
5434 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5439 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5440 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5441 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5445 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5446 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5449 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
5451 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5455 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5456 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5475 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5477 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5480 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5482 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5485 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5492 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5493 unsigned long flags)
5495 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5496 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5498 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5502 tsec = cred->security;
5503 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5504 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5506 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5512 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5514 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5520 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5521 const struct cred *cred,
5525 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5528 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5529 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5530 appear to be created. */
5534 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5536 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5537 ksec = key->security;
5539 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5542 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5544 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5545 char *context = NULL;
5549 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5558 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5561 .ptrace_may_access = selinux_ptrace_may_access,
5562 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5563 .capget = selinux_capget,
5564 .capset = selinux_capset,
5565 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
5566 .capable = selinux_capable,
5567 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5568 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5569 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5570 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5572 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5573 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5575 .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5576 .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5577 .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5578 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5580 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5581 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5582 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5583 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5584 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5585 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5586 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5587 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5588 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5589 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5590 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5593 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5594 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5595 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5596 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5597 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5598 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5599 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5600 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5601 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5602 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5603 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5604 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5605 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5606 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5607 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5608 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5609 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5610 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5611 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5612 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5613 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5614 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5615 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5616 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5617 .inode_need_killpriv = selinux_inode_need_killpriv,
5618 .inode_killpriv = selinux_inode_killpriv,
5619 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5621 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5622 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5623 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5624 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5625 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5626 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5627 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5628 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5629 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5630 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5631 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5633 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5635 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5636 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5637 .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
5638 .cred_commit = selinux_cred_commit,
5639 .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
5640 .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5641 .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
5642 .task_fix_setuid = selinux_task_fix_setuid,
5643 .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
5644 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5645 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5646 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5647 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5648 .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
5649 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5650 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5651 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5652 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5653 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5654 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5655 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5656 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5657 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5658 .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
5659 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5661 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5662 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5664 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5665 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5667 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5668 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5669 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5670 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5671 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5672 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5674 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5675 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5676 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5677 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5678 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5680 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5681 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5682 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5683 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5684 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5686 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5688 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5689 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5691 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5692 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5693 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5695 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5696 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5698 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5699 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5700 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5701 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5702 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5703 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5704 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5705 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5706 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5707 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5708 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5709 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5710 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5711 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5712 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5713 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5714 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5715 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5716 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5717 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5718 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5719 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5720 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5721 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5722 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5724 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5725 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5726 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5727 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5728 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5729 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5730 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5731 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5732 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5733 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5734 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5738 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5739 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5740 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5741 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5745 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5746 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5747 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5748 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5752 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5754 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5755 selinux_enabled = 0;
5759 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5760 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5764 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5766 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5767 cred_init_security();
5769 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5770 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5771 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5774 secondary_ops = security_ops;
5776 panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5777 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5778 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5780 if (selinux_enforcing)
5781 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5783 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5788 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5790 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5792 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5793 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5794 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5795 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5797 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
5798 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
5799 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
5800 struct superblock_security_struct,
5802 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
5804 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5805 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5806 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
5808 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5810 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5811 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5812 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
5815 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5816 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5819 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5820 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5821 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5823 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5825 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5827 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5828 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5830 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5831 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5834 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5835 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5837 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5838 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5841 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
5842 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5844 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5845 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5849 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5851 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5853 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5854 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5856 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5857 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5860 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5861 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5863 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5864 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5870 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5874 if (!selinux_enabled)
5877 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5879 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5881 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5883 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5884 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5886 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5893 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5895 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5896 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5898 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5900 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5901 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5902 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5907 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5909 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5910 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5913 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5915 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5916 static int selinux_disabled;
5918 int selinux_disable(void)
5920 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5922 if (ss_initialized) {
5923 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5927 if (selinux_disabled) {
5928 /* Only do this once. */
5932 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5934 selinux_disabled = 1;
5935 selinux_enabled = 0;
5937 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5938 security_ops = secondary_ops;
5940 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5941 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5943 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */