#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
-
-/* Global security state */
-
-unsigned securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT; /* systemwide security settings */
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(securebits);
+#include <linux/prctl.h>
+#include <linux/securebits.h>
int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
/* AUD: Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set */
- current->keep_capabilities = 0;
+ current->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
}
int cap_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
current->egid != current->gid);
}
-int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value,
- size_t size, int flags)
+int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+ const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
return 0;
}
-int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
+int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
{
if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
{
if ((old_ruid == 0 || old_euid == 0 || old_suid == 0) &&
(current->uid != 0 && current->euid != 0 && current->suid != 0) &&
- !current->keep_capabilities) {
+ !issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS)) {
cap_clear (current->cap_permitted);
cap_clear (current->cap_effective);
}
* this task could get inconsistent info. There can be no
* racing writer bc a task can only change its own caps.
*/
-long cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap)
+static long cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap)
{
if (!capable(CAP_SETPCAP))
return -EPERM;
cap_lower(current->cap_bset, cap);
return 0;
}
+
#else
int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy,
struct sched_param *lp)
}
#endif
+int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
+ unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5, long *rc_p)
+{
+ long error = 0;
+
+ switch (option) {
+ case PR_CAPBSET_READ:
+ if (!cap_valid(arg2))
+ error = -EINVAL;
+ else
+ error = !!cap_raised(current->cap_bset, arg2);
+ break;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
+ case PR_CAPBSET_DROP:
+ error = cap_prctl_drop(arg2);
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * The next four prctl's remain to assist with transitioning a
+ * system from legacy UID=0 based privilege (when filesystem
+ * capabilities are not in use) to a system using filesystem
+ * capabilities only - as the POSIX.1e draft intended.
+ *
+ * Note:
+ *
+ * PR_SET_SECUREBITS =
+ * issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED)
+ * | issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT)
+ * | issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED)
+ * | issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)
+ * | issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED)
+ *
+ * will ensure that the current process and all of its
+ * children will be locked into a pure
+ * capability-based-privilege environment.
+ */
+ case PR_SET_SECUREBITS:
+ if ((((current->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS) >> 1)
+ & (current->securebits ^ arg2)) /*[1]*/
+ || ((current->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS
+ & ~arg2)) /*[2]*/
+ || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/
+ || (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP) != 0)) { /*[4]*/
+ /*
+ * [1] no changing of bits that are locked
+ * [2] no unlocking of locks
+ * [3] no setting of unsupported bits
+ * [4] doing anything requires privilege (go read about
+ * the "sendmail capabilities bug")
+ */
+ error = -EPERM; /* cannot change a locked bit */
+ } else {
+ current->securebits = arg2;
+ }
+ break;
+ case PR_GET_SECUREBITS:
+ error = current->securebits;
+ break;
+
+#endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
+
+ case PR_GET_KEEPCAPS:
+ if (issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS))
+ error = 1;
+ break;
+ case PR_SET_KEEPCAPS:
+ if (arg2 > 1) /* Note, we rely on arg2 being unsigned here */
+ error = -EINVAL;
+ else if (issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED))
+ error = -EPERM;
+ else if (arg2)
+ current->securebits |= issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
+ else
+ current->securebits &=
+ ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ /* No functionality available - continue with default */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Functionality provided */
+ *rc_p = error;
+ return 1;
+}
+
void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p)
{
cap_set_init_eff(p->cap_effective);
cap_clear(p->cap_inheritable);
cap_set_full(p->cap_permitted);
- p->keep_capabilities = 0;
+ p->securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT;
return;
}