The L2CAP and HCI setsockopt() implementations have a small information
leak that makes it possible to leak kernel stack memory to userspace.
If the optlen parameter is 0, no data will be copied by copy_from_user(),
but the uninitialized stack buffer will be read and stored later. A call
to getsockopt() can now retrieve the leaked information.
To fix this problem the stack buffer given to copy_from_user() must be
initialized with the current settings.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
                break;
 
        case HCI_FILTER:
+               {
+                       struct hci_filter *f = &hci_pi(sk)->filter;
+
+                       uf.type_mask = f->type_mask;
+                       uf.opcode    = f->opcode;
+                       uf.event_mask[0] = *((u32 *) f->event_mask + 0);
+                       uf.event_mask[1] = *((u32 *) f->event_mask + 1);
+               }
+
                len = min_t(unsigned int, len, sizeof(uf));
                if (copy_from_user(&uf, optval, len)) {
                        err = -EFAULT;
 
 
        switch (optname) {
        case L2CAP_OPTIONS:
+               opts.imtu     = l2cap_pi(sk)->imtu;
+               opts.omtu     = l2cap_pi(sk)->omtu;
+               opts.flush_to = l2cap_pi(sk)->flush_to;
+               opts.mode     = 0x00;
+
                len = min_t(unsigned int, sizeof(opts), optlen);
                if (copy_from_user((char *) &opts, optval, len)) {
                        err = -EFAULT;
                        break;
                }
+
                l2cap_pi(sk)->imtu  = opts.imtu;
                l2cap_pi(sk)->omtu  = opts.omtu;
                break;